巴菲特寫給股東的信

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司




To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致所有股東:




Our gain in net worth during 1987 was $464 million, or 19.5%. Over the last 23 years (that is, since present management took over), our per-share book value has grown from $19.46 to $2,477.47, or at a rate of 23.1% compounded annually.

本公司在1978年的淨值增加了四億六千四百萬，較去年增加了19.5%，而過去23年以來(自從現有經營階層接手後)，每股淨值從19元成長到現在的2,477美元，年複合成長率約23.1%。


What counts, of course, is the rate of gain in per-share business value, not book value. In many cases, a corporation's book value and business value are almost totally unrelated. For example, just before they went bankrupt, LTV and Baldwin-United published yearend audits showing their book values to be 652 million and $397 million, respectively. Conversely, Belridge Oil was sold to Shell in 1979 for $3.6 billion although its book value was only $177 million.

真正重要的當然是企業每股實際價值，而非帳面價值的增加，在許多情況下一家公司的帳面與其實際價值一點關連都沒有，舉例來說，LTV與鮑德溫聯合公司就在宣佈破產之前的會計師簽證的年度報告還顯示，帳面各有淨值六億與四億美金，但是另一個公司Belridge石油在1979年以36億美元高價賣給殼牌石油之時，帳面淨值卻不到兩億。





At Berkshire, however, the two valuations have tracked rather closely, with the growth rate in business value over the last decade moderately outpacing the growth rate in book value. This good news continued in 1987.

不過在波克夏兩者成長的趨勢倒是蠻相近的，過去十年公司的實際價值成長率略高於帳面價值成長率，很高興這種好現象在今年也能持續維持。


Our premium of business value to book value has widened for two simple reasons: We own some remarkable businesses and they are run by even more remarkable managers.

我們企業價值對帳面價值的差距，因為以下二個簡單的原因又擴大了一點，一是我們擁有優秀的企業，一是這些企業皆由最優秀的經理人在管理。


You have a right to question that second assertion. After all, CEOs seldom tell their shareholders that they have assembled a bunch of turkeys to run things. Their reluctance to do so makes for some strange annual reports. Oftentimes, in his shareholders' letter, a CEO will go on for pages detailing corporate performance that is woefully inadequate. He will nonetheless end with a warm paragraph describing his managerial comrades as "our most precious asset." Such comments sometimes make you wonder what the other assets can possibly be.

各位有理由對第二個原因表示意見，因為一家企業的總經理很少會告訴公司股東說，你們所投資的公司是由一群笨蛋組成的經營階層來管理，而也就是為了要避免露出馬腳，所以常常使得一些公司常常會出現相當詭異的財務報表。通常在致股東的報告中，CEO會花一大篇幅詳細描述過去企業的表現是如何的不當，最後不可免俗地會以感性的語氣來形容其所帶領的公司幹部實在是公司最珍貴的資產，這種形容有時會讓人搞不清楚那其他的資產到底又算是什麼?


At Berkshire, however, my appraisal of our operating managers is, if anything, understated. To understand why, first take a look at page 7, where we show the earnings (on an historical-cost accounting basis) of our seven largest non-financial units: Buffalo News, Fechheimer, Kirby, Nebraska Furniture Mart, Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group, See's Candies, and World Book. In 1987, these seven business units had combined operating earnings before interest and taxes of $180 million.

不過在波克夏，我個人對於管理幹部任何的稱讚都是很容易讓人理解的，首先請看看第七頁，顯示本公司七個非金融業的主要企業-水牛城報紙、費區海默西服、寇比吸塵器、內布拉斯加傢俱、史考特飛茲集團、喜斯糖果與世界百科全書的獲利狀況(以歷史成本會計基礎)，1987年這七家公司的年度在扣除利息與所得稅前的獲利高達一億八千萬美元


By itself, this figure says nothing about economic performance. To evaluate that, we must know how much total capital - debt and equity - was needed to produce these earnings. Debt plays an insignificant role at our seven units: Their net interest expense in 1987 was only $2 million. Thus, pre-tax earnings on the equity capital employed by these businesses amounted to $178 million. And this equity - again on a historical-cost basis - was only $175 million.

單獨這數字本身並不足以說明其特殊性，但若你知道他們利用多少資金就達到這項成果時，你就知道他們是如何地了不起了，事實上這些公司的負債比例都非常的低，去年的利息費用總共加起來也不過只有二百萬美元，所以合計稅前獲利一億七千八百萬，而帳列的歷史投資股本竟只有一億七千五百萬！


If these seven business units had operated as a single company, their 1987 after-tax earnings would have been approximately $100 million - a return of about 57% on equity capital. You'll seldom see such a percentage anywhere, let alone at large, diversified companies with nominal leverage. Here's a benchmark: In its 1988 Investor's Guide issue, Fortune reported that among the 500 largest industrial companies and 500 largest service companies, only six had averaged a return on equity of over 30% during the previous decade. The best performer among the 1000 was Commerce Clearing House at 40.2%.

若把這七家公司視作是單一個體公司，則稅後淨利約為一億美元，股東權益投資報酬率更將高達57%，即使財務杠杆再高，你也很難在一般公司看到這種比率，根據財星雜誌在1988年出版的投資人手冊，在全美五百大製造業與五百大服務業中，只有六家公司過去十年的股東權益報酬率超過30%，最高的一家也不過只有40.2%。


Of course, the returns that Berkshire earns from these seven units are not as high as their underlying returns because, in aggregate, we bought the businesses at a substantial premium to underlying equity capital. Overall, these operations are carried on our books at about $222 million above the historical accounting values of the underlying assets. However, the managers of the units should be judged by the returns they achieve on the underlying assets; what we pay for a business does not affect the mount of capital its manager has to work with. (If, to become a shareholder and part owner of Commerce Clearing House, you pay, say, six times book value, that does not change CCH's return on equity.)

當然Berkshire真正從這些公司賺得的報酬並沒有那麼地高，因為當初買下這些公司時，支付了相當的溢價才取得這些股份，經過統計我們在這些公司原始投資超過其帳列的股權淨值的溢價金額約為二億二千二百萬美元，當然要判斷這些公司經理人的績效應該是要看他們創造的盈餘是靠多少資產所產生的，至於我們用多少錢買下這些公司與經理人的績效並無關聯，就算你用高於淨值六倍的價錢買下一家公司，同樣也不會影響該公司的股東權益報酬率。


Three important inferences can be drawn from the figures I have cited. First, the current business value of these seven units is far above their historical book value and also far above the value at which they are carried on Berkshire's balance sheet. Second, because so little capital is required to run these businesses, they can grow while concurrently making almost all of their earnings available for deployment in new opportunities. Third, these businesses are run by truly extraordinary managers. The Blumkins, the Heldmans, Chuck Huggins, Stan Lipsey, and Ralph Schey all held unusual talent, energy and character to achieve exceptional financial results.

以上所提數字代表著三項重要的指標，首先現在這七家企業的真正價值遠高於其帳面淨值，同樣也遠高於Berkshire帳列的投資成本，第二因為經營這些事業並不需要太多的資金，所以這些公司利用所賺取的盈餘便足以支應本身業務的發展，第三這些事業都由非常能幹的經理人在經營，像是Blumkins家族、Heldmans、Chuck Huggins、Stan Lipsey與Ralph Schey皆兼具才幹、精力與品格，將旗下事業經營的有聲有色。


For good reasons, we had very high expectations when we joined with these managers. In every case, however, our experience has greatly exceeded those expectations. We have received far more than we deserve, but we are willing to accept such inequities. (We subscribe to the view Jack Benny expressed upon receiving an acting award: "I don't deserve this, but then, I have arthritis and I don't deserve that either.")

也因此當初這些明星經理人加入時，我們並抱持著極高的期待，事後證明得到的結果遠高於預期，我們獲得遠高於我們所應得的，當然我們很樂意接受這樣不公平的對待，我們借用傑克班尼在獲得最佳男主角時的感言：「我不應該得到這個獎項，但同樣地我也不應該得到關節炎。」


Beyond the Sainted Seven, we have our other major unit, insurance, which I believe also has a usiness value well above the net assets employed in it. However, appraising the business value of a property-casualty insurance company is a decidedly imprecise process. The industry is volatile, reported earnings oftentimes are seriously inaccurate, and recent changes in the Tax Code will severely hurt future profitability. Despite these problems, we like the business and it will almost certainly remain our largest operation. Under Mike Goldberg's management, the insurance business should treat us well over time.

除了這七個聖徒之外，我們還有一項主要的事業-保險，同樣地我也認為它的價值遠高於其帳列的資產，只是要評估一家產物意外險公司的價值就沒有辦法那麼明確了，這個產業變動很大，報表所列的獲利數位有時會有很大的偏差，而且最近稅法修正對我們未來年度的獲利有很大的影響，儘管如此保險事業仍會是我們經營事業的最大重心，在Mike Goldberg的管理之下，保險事業的報酬仍可期待。


With managers like ours, my partner, Charlie Munger, and I have little to do with operations. in fact, it is probably fair to say that if we did more, less would be accomplished. We have no corporate meetings, no corporate budgets, and no performance reviews (though our managers, of course, oftentimes find such procedures useful at their operating units). After all, what can we tell the Blumkins about home furnishings, or the Heldmans about uniforms?

有這些優秀的專業經理人，在事業的日常營運上，查理孟格跟我實在是沒有什麼好費心思的地方，事實上，平心而論我們管的越多，可能只會把事情搞砸，在Berkshire我們沒有企業會議，也沒有年度預算，更沒有績效考核(當然各個企業單位因應自身所需，有自己的一套管理辦法) ，但總的來說，我們實在沒有什麼可以告訴指導Blumkin如何去賣傢俱事業或是指導Heldman家族如何經營制服事業。


Our major contribution to the operations of our subsidiaries is applause. But it is not the indiscriminate applause of a Pollyanna. Rather it is informed applause based upon the two long careers we have spent intensively observing business performance and managerial behavior. Charlie and I have seen so much of the ordinary in business that we can truly appreciate a virtuoso performance. Only one response to the 1987 performance of our operating managers is appropriate: sustained, deafening applause.

我們對於這些所屬事業單位最重要的支持就是適時地給予掌聲，但這絕對不是在做爛好人，相反地這是長久下來我們深入觀察這些企業的經營結果與管理當局的作為所給予的正面肯定，我們兩個人這些年來看過太多平庸企業的表現，所以我們是真正地珍惜他們藝術級的演出，對於1987年旗下子公司整體的表現，我們只能報以熱烈的掌聲，而且是震耳欲聾的掌聲。


Sources of Reported Earnings

盈餘的來源




The table on the following page shows the major sources of Berkshire's reported earnings. In the table, amortization of Goodwill and other major purchase-price accounting adjustments are not charged against the specific businesses to which they apply but, instead, are aggregated and shown separately. In effect, this procedure presents the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. In appendixes to my letters in the 1983 and 1986 annual reports, I explained why this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than the standard GAAP presentation, which makes purchase-price adjustments on a business-by business basis. The total net earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP figures in our audited financial statements.

下表顯示Berkshire主要盈餘的來源，其中商譽的攤銷與購買法的會計調整數，特別從各個企業挑出匯總成單獨一欄，事實上這樣的目的是為了讓旗下事業的經營績效，不因我們買下他們而有所影響，在1983與1986年的年報中，我已不只一次的解釋這樣的表達方式會比依照一般公認會計原則更符合管理當局與投資者的需要，當然最後加總結算的數位，還是會與會計師出具的財務報表上的盈餘數位完全一致。


In the Business Segment Data on pages 36-38 and in the Management's Discussion section on pages 40-44 you will find much additional information about our businesses. In these sections you will also find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. I urge you to read that material, as well as Charlie Munger's letter to Wesco shareholders, describing the various businesses of that subsidiary, which starts on page 45.

在後面的部門別資訊中，大家可以找到個別事業的詳細資訊，除此之外，我也強烈建議大家一定要看查理寫給Wesco股東敍述其旗下事業情況的一封信


1987 Unit:US'000
Earnings Before Income Tax After Income Tax
Percent Total Berkshire Share Berkshire Share
Earnings from Operation
Insurance Group
Underwriting (55,429) (20,696)
Net Investment Income 152,483 136,658


Buffalio News 39,410 21,304
Fechheimer 13,332 6,580

Kirby 22,408 12,891

Nebraska Furniture Mart 16,837 7,554

Scott Fetzer-Diversified 30,591 17,555
See's Candies 31,693 17,363
Wesco Financial Corporation-Parent 6,209 4,978
World Book 25,745 15,136
Amortization of Goodwill (2,862) (2,862)
Interest on Debt (11,474) (5,905)
Shareholder's Contribution (4,938) (2,963)
Other 16,914 7,152
0 280,919 　 214,745

Realized Securities Gain 27,319 19,807
Total Earnings-all entities 0 308,238 　 234,552



Gypsy Rose Lee announced on one of her later birthdays: "I have everything I had last year; it's just that it's all two inches lower." As the table shows, during 1987 almost all of our businesses aged in a more upbeat way.

Gypsy Rose Lee在她晚年的一場生日宴會上宣佈：「我還是擁有去年所有的一切，現在唯一的差別是全部都矮了兩吋。」如同本表所示，在1987年幾乎我們所有的事業都又成長的一歲。


There's not a lot new to report about these businesses - and that's good, not bad. Severe change and exceptional returns usually don't mix. Most investors, of course, behave as if just the opposite were true. That is, they usually confer the highest price-earnings ratios on exotic-sounding businesses that hold out the promise of feverish change. That prospect lets investors fantasize about future profitability rather than face today's business realities. For such investor-dreamers, any blind date is preferable to one with the girl next door, no matter how desirable she may be.

我們旗下這些事業實在是沒有什麼新的變化可以特別提出報告的，所謂沒有消息就是好消息，劇烈的變動通常不會有特別好的績效，當然這與大部分的投資人認為的剛好相反，大家通常將最高的本益比給予那些擅長畫大餅的企業，這些美好的遠景會讓投資人不顧現實經營的情況，而一昧幻想未來可能的獲利美夢，對於這種愛做夢的投資人來說，任何路邊的野花，都會比鄰家的女孩來的具吸引力，不管後者是如何賢慧。


Experience, however, indicates that the best business returns are usually achieved by companies that are doing something quite similar today to what they were doing five or ten years ago. That is no argument for managerial complacency. Businesses always have opportunities to improve service, product lines, manufacturing techniques, and the like, and obviously these opportunities should be seized. But a business that constantly encounters major change also encounters many chances for major error. Furthermore, economic terrain that is forever shifting violently is ground on which it is difficult to build a fortress-like business franchise. Such a franchise is usually the key to sustained high returns.

經驗顯示，能夠創造盈餘新高的企業，現在做生意的方式通常與其五年前甚至十年前沒有多大的差異，當然管理當局絕對不能夠太過自滿，因為企業總有不斷的機會可以改善本身的服務、產品線、製造能力等等，且絕對必須要好好把握，不過一家公司若是為了改變而改變，反而可能增加犯錯的機會，講的更深入一點，在一塊動盪不安的土地之上，是不太可能建造一座固若金湯的城堡，而具有這樣穩定特質的企業卻是持續創造高獲利的關鍵。


The Fortune study I mentioned earlier supports our view. Only 25 of the 1,000 companies met two tests of economic excellence - an average return on equity of over 20% in the ten years, 1977 through 1986, and no year worse than 15%. These business superstars were also stock market superstars: During the decade, 24 of the 25 outperformed the S&P 500.

先前提到財星雜誌的研究，可以充分支持我的論點，在1977年到1986年間，總計1,000家中只有25家能夠達到連續十年平均股東權益報酬率達到20%的標準，且沒有一年低於15%的雙重標準，而這些優質企業同時也是股票市場上的寵兒，在所有的25家中有24家的表現超越S&P500指數。


The Fortune champs may surprise you in two respects. First, most use very little leverage compared to their interest-paying capacity. Really good businesses usually don't need to borrow. Second, except for one company that is "high-tech" and several others that manufacture ethical drugs, the companies are in businesses that, on balance, seem rather mundane. Most sell non-sexy products or services in much the same manner as they did ten years ago (though in larger quantities now, or at higher prices, or both). The record of these 25 companies confirms that making the most of an already strong business franchise, or concentrating on a single winning business theme, is what usually produces exceptional economics.

這些財富之星可能讓你大開眼界，首先相對於本身支付利息的能力，他們所運用的財務杠杆極其有限，一家真正好的公司是不需要借錢的，第二除了有一家是所謂的高科技公司，另外少數幾家屬于制藥業以外，大多數的公司產業相當平凡普通，大部分現在銷售的產品或服務與十年前大致相同，(雖然數量或是價格、或是兩者都有，比以前高很多)，這些公司的記錄顯示，充分運用現有產業地位，或是專注在單一領導的產品品牌之上通常是創造企業暴利的不二法門。


Berkshire's experience has been similar. Our managers have produced extraordinary results by doing rather ordinary things - but doing them exceptionally well. Our managers protect their franchises, they control costs, they search for new products and markets that build on their existing strengths and they don't get diverted. They work exceptionally hard at the details of their businesses, and it shows.

事實上我們在Berkshire的經驗正是如此，我們的專業經理人所以能夠締造優異的成績，所從事的業務相當平凡，但重點是把它們做到極致，經理人致力於保護企業本身、控制成本，基於現有能力尋找新產品與新市場來鞏固既有優勢，他們從不受外界誘惑，钜細靡遺地專注於企業之上，而其成績有目共睹。


Here's an update:

以下是近況報導




Agatha Christie, whose husband was an archaeologist, said that was the perfect profession for one's spouse: "The older you become, the more interested they are in you." It is students of business management, not archaeologists, who should be interested in Mrs. B (Rose Blumkin), the 94-year-old chairman of Nebraska Furniture Mart.

克裏思蒂小姐嫁給一位考古學家，她曾說︰「配偶最理想的職業就是考古學家，因為你越老，他就越有興趣」，事實上應該是商學院而非考古學系的學生，需要多多研究B太太-這位NFM高齡94歲的負責人。


Fifty years ago Mrs. B started the business with $500, and today NFM is far and away the largest home furnishings store in the country. Mrs. B continues to work seven days a week at the job from the opening of each business day until the close. She buys, she sells, she manages - and she runs rings around the competition. It's clear to me that she's gathering speed and may well reach her full potential in another five or ten years. Therefore, I've persuaded the Board to scrap our mandatory retirement-at-100 policy. (And it's about time: With every passing year, this policy has seemed sillier to me.)

五十年以前B太太以五百塊美金創業，到如今NFM已是全美遠近馳名的傢俱量販店，但是B太太還是一樣從早到晚，一個禮拜工作七天，掌管採購、銷售與管理，我很確定她現在正蓄勢待發，準備在未來的五到十年內，全力衝刺再創高峰，也因此我已說服董事會取消一百歲強迫退休的年齡上限，(也該是時候了，隨著時光的流逝，越來我越相信這個規定是該修改了)


Net sales of NFM were $142.6 million in 1987, up 8% from 1986. There's nothing like this store in the country, and there's nothing like the family Mrs. B has produced to carry on: Her son Louie, and his three boys, Ron, Irv and Steve, possess the business instincts, integrity and drive of Mrs. B. They work as a team and, strong as each is individually, the whole is far greater than the sum of the parts.

去年(1987年) NFM的銷貨淨額是一億四千多萬美元，較前一年度成長8%，這是全美獨一無二的一家店，也是全美獨一無二的家族，B太太跟她三個兒子擁有天生的生意頭腦、品格與沖勁，且分工合作，團結一致。


The superb job done by the Blumkins benefits us as owners, but even more dramatically benefits NFM's customers. They saved about $30 million in 1987 by buying from NFM. In other words, the goods they bought would have cost that much more if purchased elsewhere.

B太太家族的傑出表現，不但讓身為股東的我們受益良多，NFM的客戶們更受惠更大，只要選擇NFM的產品據估計光是1987年就可省下至少三千萬美元，換句話說若客戶到別處去買可能要貴上這麼多錢。


You'll enjoy an anonymous letter I received last August: "Sorry to see Berkshire profits fall in the second quarter. One way you may gain back part of your lost. (sic) Check the pricing at The Furniture Mart. You will find that they are leaving 10% to 20% on the table. This additional profit on $140 million of sells (sic) is $28 million. Not small change in anyone's pocket! Check out other furniture, carpet, appliance and T.V. dealers. Your raising prices to a reasonable profit will help. Thank you.
/signed/ A Competitor."

去年我接到一封無名氏所寫的相當有趣的信︰「很遺憾看到Berkshire第二季的獲利下滑，想要提高 貴公司的獲利嗎? 有一個不錯的法子，去查查NFM的產品售價，你會發現他們把一、兩成的獲利空間白白奉送給客戶，算算一年一億四千萬的營業額，那可是二千八百萬的利潤，這個數字實在是相當可觀，再看看別家傢俱、地毯或是電器用品的價格，你就會發現把價格調回來是再合理不過了
謝謝
一位競爭同業留」


NFM will continue to grow and prosper by following Mrs. B's maxim: "Sell cheap and tell the truth."

展望未來NFM在B太太「價格公道實在」的座右銘領導下，必將繼續成長茁壯。


Among dominant papers of its size or larger, the Buffalo News continues to be the national leader in two important ways: (1) its weekday and Sunday penetration rate (the percentage of households in the paper's primary market area that purchase it); and (2) its "news-hole" percentage (the portion of the paper devoted to news).

在全美相同規模(或甚至更大)的報紙中，水牛城報紙有兩個特點第一、它在平時與假日的普及率最高(即訂戶數在該地區家戶數的比率)，第二是新聞比率最高(新聞版面占總版面的比率)


It may not be coincidence that one newspaper leads in both categories: an exceptionally "newsrich" product makes for broad audience appeal, which in turn leads to high penetration. Of course, quantity must be matched by quality. This not only means good reporting and good writing; it means freshness and relevance. To be indispensable, a paper must promptly tell its readers many things they want to know but won't otherwise learn until much later, if ever.

事實上一份報紙能夠同時擁有這兩項特色絕對不是巧合，因為新聞內容越豐富，也就越能吸引更廣泛的讀者，從而提高普及率，當然除了量之外，新聞品質也很重要，這不但代表要有好的報導與編輯，也代表要有即時性與關聯性，為了讓報紙成為讀者們不可或缺的東西，它必須能夠馬上告訴讀者許多他們想要知道的事情，而不是等讀者們都已知道後，事後報紙才刊登出來。


At the News, we put out seven fresh editions every 24 hours, each one extensively changed in content. Here's a small example that may surprise you: We redo the obituary page in every edition of the News, or seven times a day. Any obituary added runs through the next six editions until the publishing cycle has been completed.

以水牛城日報來說我們平均每24小時出七個版本，每次內容都會更新，舉一個簡單的例子就足以讓人感到驚奇，光是每天的訃文就會更新七次，也就是說每則新增的訃文會在報紙上連續刊登七個版。


It's vital, of course, for a newspaper to cover national and international news well and in depth. But it is also vital for it to do what only a local newspaper can: promptly and extensively chronicle the personally-important, otherwise-unreported details of community life. Doing this job well requires a very broad range of news - and that means lots of space, intelligently used.

當然一份新聞也必須要有有深度的全國與國際性新聞，但一份地區性的報紙也必須及時並廣泛地報導社區動態，要把這點做好除了必須要有足夠的空間，並加以有效地運用。


Our news hole was about 50% in 1987, just as it has been year after year. If we were to cut it to a more typical 40%, we would save approximately $4 million annually in newsprint costs. That interests us not at all - and it won't interest us even if, for one reason or another, our profit margins should significantly shrink.

如同往年，去年(1987年)我們的新聞比大約是50%，若是我們把這比率砍到一般40%的水準，我們一年約可省下四百萬美金的新聞成本，但我們從來都不會考慮如此做，就算哪一天我們的獲利大幅縮減也是一樣。


Charlie and I do not believe in flexible operating budgets, as in "Non-direct expenses can be X if revenues are Y, but must be reduced if revenues are Y - 5%." Should we really cut our news hole at the Buffalo News, or the quality of product and service at See's, simply because profits are down during a given year or quarter? Or, conversely, should we add a staff economist, a corporate strategist, an institutional advertising campaign or something else that does Berkshire no good simply because the money currently is rolling in? That makes no sense to us. We neither understand the adding of unneeded people or activities because profits are booming, nor the cutting of essential people or activities because profitability is shrinking. That kind of yo-yo approach is neither business-like nor humane. Our goal is to do what makes sense for Berkshire's customers and employees at all times, and never to add the unneeded. ("But what about the corporate jet?" you rudely ask. Well, occasionally a man must rise above principle.)

基本上查理跟我都不太相信營業預算，像是「間接費用必須縮減，因為預估營業收入不若以往」之類的說法，。如果有一天我們必須降低新聞比率或是犧牲喜斯糖果的品質與服務，以提升疲弱不振的獲利表現，或是相反地因為Berkshire太多錢以致現金花不完，就去聘請經濟分析師、公關顧問等對公司一點幫助都沒有的人。這些做法一點道理都沒有，我們完全不瞭解為何有些公司因為公司賺太多錢就增加一些沒有用的人來消化預算，或是因為獲利不佳就砍掉一些關鍵的人事，這種變來變去的方式既不符合人性也不符合商業原則，我們的目標是不論如何都要做對Berkshire的客戶與員工有意義的事，(你可能會問那公司專機又是怎麼一回事??嗯!我想有時一個人總會有忘了原則的時候)


Although the News' revenues have grown only moderately since 1984, superb management by Stan Lipsey, its publisher, has produced excellent profit growth. For several years, I have incorrectly predicted that profit margins at the News would fall. This year I will not let vou down: Margins will, without question, shrink in 1988 and profit may fall as well. Skyrocketing newsprint costs will be the major cause.

雖然水牛城新聞的營收最近幾年只有些微的成長，但在發行人Stan Lipsey傑出的管理之下，獲利卻反而大幅成長，有好幾年我甚至錯誤地預測該報的獲利會下滑，而同樣地今年我也不會讓大家失望，1988年不管是毛利或者是獲利都會縮水，其中新聞印刷成本的飛漲是主要的原因。


Fechheimer Bros. Company is another of our family businesses - and, like the Blumkins, what a family. Three generations of Heldmans have for decades consistently, built the sales and profits of this manufacturer and distributor of uniforms. In the year that Berkshire acquired its controlling interest in Fechheimer - 1986 - profits were a record. The Heldmans didn't slow down after that. Last year earnings increased substantially and the outlook is good for 1988.

費區海默兄弟公司是我們旗下另一個家族企業，而就像Blumkins一樣是個非常傑出的家族，Heldmans家族三代幾十年來，努力不懈地建立了這家制服製造與銷售公司，而在Berkshire取得所有權的1986年，該公司的獲利更創新高，此後Heldmans家族並未停下腳步，去年(1987年)盈餘又大幅增加，而展望今年(1988年)前景更是看好。


There's nothing magic about the Uniform business; the only magic is in the Heldmans. Bob, George, Gary, Roger and Fred know the business inside and out, and they have fun running it. We are fortunate to be in partnership with them.

在制服事業大概沒有什麼出奇的事，唯一的驚奇就是Heldmans家族，Bob、George、Gary、Roger跟Fred，對於這行業熟的不能再熟，同時也樂在其中，我們何其有幸能與他們一起合作共事。




Chuck Huggins continues to set new records at See's, just as he has ever since we put him in charge on the day of our purchase some 16 years ago. In 1987, volume hit a new high at slightly Under 25 million pounds. For the second year in a row, moreover, same-store sales, measured in pounds, were virtually unchanged. In case you are wondering, that represents improvement: In each of the previous six years, same-store sales had fallen.

Chuck Huggins持續為喜斯糖果締造新猷，自從十六年前我們買下這家公司，並請他主掌這項事業時，便一直是如此，在1987年糖果銷售量創下近二千五百萬英鎊的新高，同時連續第二年單店平均營業額維持不墜，你可能會覺得沒什麼了不起，事實上這已是相當大的改善，因為過去連續六年數字都呈現下滑的趨勢。


Although we had a particularly strong 1986 Christmas season, we racked up better store-for-store comparisons in the 1987 Christmas season than at any other time of the year. Thus, the seasonal factor at See's becomes even more extreme. In 1987, about 85% of our profit was earned during December.

雖然1986年的耶誕節特別旺，但1987年的記錄比86年還要好，使得季節因素對喜斯糖果來說越來越重要，經統計去年一整年約有85%的獲利是在十二月單月所創造的。


Candy stores are fun to visit, but most have not been fun for their owners. From what we can learn, practically no one besides See's has made significant profits in recent years from the operation of candy shops. Clearly, Chuck's record at See's is not due to a rising industry tide. Rather, it is a one-of-a-kind performance.

糖果店是個很好玩的地方，但對大部分的老闆來說就不那麼有趣了，就我們所知，這幾年來除了喜斯賺大錢之外，其他糖果店的經營皆相當慘澹，所以很明顯的喜斯搭的並不是順風車，它的表現是扎扎實實的。


His achievement requires an excellent product - which we have - but it also requires genuine affection for the customer. Chuck is 100% customer-oriented, and his attitude sets the tone for the rest of the See's organization.

這項成就當然需要優秀的產品，這個倒不是問題，因為我們確實擁有，但除此之外它還需要對客戶衷心的服務，Chuck可以說是百分之百地為客戶設想，而他的態度更直接感染到公司上下所有的員工。


Here's an example of Chuck in action: At See's we regularly add new pieces of candy to our mix and also cull a few to keep our product line at about 100 varieties. Last spring we selected 14 items for elimination. Two, it turned out, were badly missed by our customers, who wasted no time in letting us know what they thought of our judgment: "A pox on all in See's who participated in the abominable decision...;" "May your new truffles melt in transit, may they sour in people's mouths, may your costs go up and your profits go down...;" "We are investigating the possibility of obtaining a mandatory injunction requiring you to supply...;" You get the picture. In all, we received many hundreds of letters.

以下是一個具體的例證，在喜斯我們通常會定期增添新的口味並刪除舊的口味以維持大約一百種組合，去年我們淘汰了14種口味，結果其中有兩種讓我們的客戶無法忘懷，而不斷地表達他們對我們這種舉動的不滿，「願喜斯所有做出這種卑鄙決定的相關人士嘴巴流膿長瘡；願你們新的巧克力糖在運送途中融化；願你們吃到酸掉的糖果；願你們的虧大錢；我們正試圖尋求要求你們恢復供應原有口味的法院強制令」，總計最後我們收到好幾百封的抱怨信。


Chuck not only reintroduced the pieces, he turned this miscue into an opportunity. Each person who had written got a complete and honest explanation in return. Said Chuck's letter: "Fortunately, when I make poor decisions, good things often happen as a result...;" And with the letter went a special gift certificate.

為此Chuck不但重新推出原來的口味，他還將危機化為轉機，所有來信的客戶都得到完整且誠實的回復，信上是這樣寫的︰「雖然我們做出錯誤的決定，但值得慶倖的是最後得以以喜劇收場」，隨信還附贈一個特別的小禮物。


See's increased prices only slightly in the last two years. In 1988 we have raised prices somewhat more, though still moderately. To date, sales have been weak and it may be difficult for See's to improve its earnings this year.

過去兩年喜斯糖果僅稍微地漲價，在今年(1988年)我們仍會繼續調漲價格，幅度還算合理，只是截至目前為止銷售持續低迷，預計今年公司盈餘將難再有繼續成長的可能性。


World Book, Kirby, and the Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group are all under the management of Ralph Schey. And what a lucky thing for us that they are. I told you last year that Scott Fetzer performance in 1986 had far exceeded the expectations that Charlie and I had at the time of our purchase. Results in 1987 were even better. Pre-tax earnings rose 10% while average capital employed declined significantly.

世界百科全書、寇比吸塵器與史考特費茲製造集團皆由Ralph所領導，很高興我們能做這樣的安排，去年我曾告訴各位史考特費茲集團在我們買下公司的當年度-1986年的表現超乎預期，但去年1987年的表現更出色，稅前獲利成長了10%，但所耗費的資金卻較前年大幅縮減。


Ralph's mastery of the 19 businesses for which he is responsible is truly amazing, and he has also attracted some outstanding managers to run them. We would love to find a few additional units that could be put under Ralph's wing.

Ralph同時掌管19項事業的方式實在是令人歎為觀止，同時他也吸引了一群優秀的經理人協助他經營事業，我們很樂意在多找一些事業交到Ralph旗下去經營。


The businesses of Scott Fetzer are too numerous to describe in detail. Let's just update you on one of our favorites: At the end of 1987, World Book introduced its most dramatically-revised edition since 1962. The number of color photos was increased from 14,000 to 24,000; over 6,000 articles were revised; 840 new contributors were added. Charlie and I recommend this product to you and your family, as we do World Book's products for younger children, Childcraft and Early World of Learning.

由於史考特費茲的事業範圍過於繁雜，在此不便詳述，這裏謹就其中一項我們的最愛-世界百科全書加以介紹，去年底世界百科全書推出自1962年以來改版最多的最新版本，全套書中的彩色照片從14,000禎增加到24,000禎，超過6,000篇文章從新編寫，840位作者參與；查理跟我衷心向您與您的家庭推薦包含世界百科全書與兒童工藝等一系列的套書。


In 1987, World Book unit sales in the United States increased for the fifth consecutive year. International sales and profits also grew substantially. The outlook is good for Scott Fetzer operations in aggregate, and for World Book in particular.

在去年該套書在美國地區銷售量連續第五年成長，國外地區的銷量與獲利亦大幅增加，史考特費茲集團前景看好，尤其世界百科全書更是如此。


Insurance Operations

保險事業營運




Shown below is an updated version of our usual table presenting key figures for the insurance industry:

下表是我們慣用保險業主要指數的最近更新數字




Yearly Change in Combined Ratio Yearly Change in GNP Deflators
Premiums Written Incurred Loss
1981 3.8% 106.0% 6.5% 9.7%
1982 4.4% 109.8% 8.4% 6.4%
1983 4.6% 112.0% 6.8% 3.9%
1984 9.2% 117.9% 16.9% 3.8%
1985 22.1% 116.5% 16.1% 3.3%
1986 (Rev.) 22.2% 108.0% 13.5% 2.6%
1987 (Est.) 8.7% 104.7% 6.8% 3.0%


The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums: A ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss. When the investment income that an insurer earns from holding on to policyholders' funds ("the float") is taken into account, a combined ratio in the 107-111 range typically produces an overall break-even result, exclusive of earnings on the funds provided by shareholders.

綜合比率代表所有保險成本(發生損失加上費用)占保費收入的比率，一百以下表示有承保的獲利，一百以上則有承保的損失，若考量保險公司利用保費收入(浮存金)所賺取的投資收益列入計算，則107到111之間大約是損益兩平點，當然這是不包含公司自有資金所運用的收益。


The math of the insurance business, encapsulated by the table, is not very complicated. In years when the industry's annual gain in revenues (premiums) pokes along at 4% or 5%, underwriting losses are sure to mount. That is not because auto accidents, fires, windstorms and the like are occurring more frequently, nor has it lately been the fault of general inflation. Today, social and judicial inflation are the major culprits; the cost of entering a courtroom has simply ballooned. Part of the jump in cost arises from skyrocketing verdicts, and part from the tendency of judges and juries to expand the coverage of insurance policies beyond that contemplated by the insurer when the policies were written. Seeing no let-up in either trend, we continue to believe that the industry's revenues must grow at about 10% annually for it to just hold its own in terms of profitability, even though general inflation may be running at a considerably lower rate.

保險事業的數字，若以上面那張簡表來說明，事實上並不會太複雜，當同業平均保費收入年成長只在4%或5%徘徊，則當年承保損失一定會上升，原因不在於車禍、火災、暴風等意外事件發生更頻繁，也不是因為一般通貨膨脹的關係。主要的禍首在於今天社會與司法過度膨脹，法律訴訟費用暴增，一方面是因為訴訟更頻繁，一方面是由於陪審團與法官傾向擴大保險單上的保險理賠範圍，若這種亂象不能加以抑止，則保險公司每年至少要有10%以上的保費收入年成長，才有辦法收支打平，即使在通貨膨脹相對溫和的狀況下也是如此。


The strong revenue gains of 1985-87 almost guaranteed the industry an excellent underwriting performance in 1987 and, indeed, it was a banner year. But the news soured as the quarters rolled by: Best's estimates that year-over-year volume increases were 12.9%, 11.1%, 5.7%, and 5.6%. In 1988, the revenue gain is certain to be far below our 10% "equilibrium" figure. Clearly, the party is over.

過去三年來保費收入的大幅成長幾乎可以確定今年同業的績效都會相當不錯，事實證明也是如此，不過接下來的情況可就不太妙了，根據Best's統計預估，1988年的每季的成長率將由12.9%按季逐漸下滑至11.1%、5.7%、5.6%，可以確定的是1988年的保費成長一定會低於10%的損益兩平點，很明顯的好日子已經不多了。


However, earnings will not immediately sink. A lag factor exists in this industry: Because most policies are written for a one-year term, higher or lower insurance prices do not have their full impact on earnings until many months after they go into effect. Thus, to resume our metaphor, when the party ends and the bar is closed, you are allowed to finish your drink. If results are not hurt by a major natural catastrophe, we predict a small climb for the industry's combined ratio in 1988, followed by several years of larger increases.

然而盈餘數字卻不會馬上滑落，這個產業具有遞延的現象，因為大部分的保單都是一年期，所以對於損益的影響會在往後的一年之間陸續浮現，因此打個比方，在party結束、酒吧關門之前，你還可以把手上的那杯喝完了再走，假設往後幾年沒有發生什麼天災地變，我們預期1988年的同業平均綜合比率將會微幅上揚，緊接下來的幾年則會大幅攀升。


The insurance industry is cursed with a set of dismal economic characteristics that make for a poor long-term outlook: hundreds of competitors, ease of entry, and a product that cannot be differentiated in any meaningful way. In such a commodity-like business, only a very low-cost operator or someone operating in a protected, and usually small, niche can sustain high profitability levels.

保險業最近受到幾項不利的經濟因素所困而前景黯淡，數以百計的競爭對手、進入障礙低、無法大幅差異化的產品特性，在這種類似商品型產業之中，只有營運成本低的公司或是一些受到保護的利基產品才有可能有長期獲利成長的機會。


When shortages exist, however, even commodity businesses flourish. The insurance industry enjoyed that kind of climate for a while but it is now gone. One of the ironies of capitalism is that most managers in commodity industries abhor shortage conditions - even though those are the only circumstances permitting them good returns. Whenever shortages appear, the typical manager simply can't wait to expand capacity and thereby plug the hole through which money is showering upon him. This is precisely what insurance managers did in 1985-87, confirming again Disraeli's observation: "What we learn from history is that we do not learn from history."

當產品供給短缺時，即使是商品化產業也能蓬勃發展，不過在保險業界，這種好日子早就已經過去了，資本主義最諷刺的地方就是商品型產業大部分的經理人都痛恨商品短缺不足，但偏偏這是唯一可能讓這些公司有獲利的機會，當短缺出現時，經理人便會迫不及待地想要擴充產能，這無異是將源源不斷流入現金的水龍頭關掉一樣，這就是過去三年保險公司經理人的最佳寫照，再次驗證Disraeli的名言：「我們唯一從歷史得到的教訓就是我們從來無法從歷史得到教訓！」


At Berkshire, we work to escape the industry's commodity economics in two ways. First, we differentiate our product by our financial strength, which exceeds that of all others in the industry. This strength, however, is limited in its usefulness. It means nothing in the personal insurance field: The buyer of an auto or homeowners policy is going to get his claim paid even if his insurer fails (as many have). It often means nothing in the commercial insurance arena: When times are good, many major corporate purchasers of insurance and their brokers pay scant attention to the insurer's ability to perform under the more adverse conditions that may exist, say, five years later when a complicated claim is finally resolved. (Out of sight, out of mind - and, later on, maybe out-of-pocket.)

在Berkshire，我們努力避免自己的公司成為商品化的企業，首先我們憑藉著自己強大的資金實力，來凸顯我們產品的不同，但這種效果實在是有限，尤其在個人險的部份，因為即使是其所投保的保險公司倒閉(事實上這種狀況還不少)，汽車險或或房屋險的購買者仍可獲得理賠，在商業險的部份也是如此，當情況好時，許多大企業投保戶與保險掮客都不太關心保險業者的財務狀況，即使是比較複雜的案件，頂多拖個三、五年，最後還是有辦法可以解決，(眼不見為淨的結果，可能會讓你的口袋落空)


Periodically, however, buyers remember Ben Franklin's observation that it is hard for an empty sack to stand upright and recognize their need to buy promises only from insurers that have enduring financial strength. It is then that we have a major competitive advantage. When a buyer really focuses on whether a $10 million claim can be easily paid by his insurer five or ten years down the road, and when he takes into account the possibility that poor underwriting conditions may then coincide with depressed financial markets and defaults by reinsurer, he will find only a few companies he can trust. Among those, Berkshire will lead the pack.

不過一段期間保戶會偶爾想起佛蘭克林所說的空沙包很難站的直挺，並瞭解尋找一個可靠穩定的保險公司的重要性，這時我們發揮優勢的機會就來了，當客戶認真想到往後五到十年，若是面對景氣不佳同時又碰上金融市場低迷，再保業者倒閉頻繁等景象時，而懷疑保險公司是否仍有能力輕鬆地支付一千萬美元理賠金時，那麼他可以挑選的保險公司其實是相當有限的，在所有的沙包之中，Berkshire無疑是站得最直挺的一個。


Our second method of differentiating ourselves is the total indifference to volume that we maintain. In 1989, we will be perfectly willing to write five times as much business as we write in 1988 - or only one-fifth as much. We hope, of course, that conditions will allow us large volume. But we cannot control market prices. If they are unsatisfactory, we will simply do very little business. No other major insurer acts with equal restraint.

我們第二個方法是試著讓我們完全不理會簽發保單的數量，在下一個年度我們很願意一口氣簽出比前一年多五倍的保單，但若是只能簽發五分之一的保單也無所謂，當然情況若許可我們希望是越多越好，但我們實在是無法掌握市場價格，若價格不理想，我們就會暫時退出市場少做一點生意，在同業中再沒有其他任何一家保險公司有我們如此高的自製力。


Three conditions that prevail in insurance, but not in most businesses, allow us our flexibility. First, market share is not an important determinant of profitability: In this business, in contrast to the newspaper or grocery businesses, the economic rule is not survival of the fattest. Second, in many sectors of insurance, including most of those in which we operate, distribution channels are not proprietary and can be easily entered: Small volume this year does not preclude huge volume next year. Third, idle capacity - which in this industry largely means people - does not result in intolerable costs. In a way that industries such as printing or steel cannot, we can operate at quarter-speed much of the time and still enjoy long-term prosperity.

在保險業普遍存在的第三種情況，(這在其他產業並不多見)使得我們能保持相當的彈性，第一市場佔有率並不絕對等於獲利率，不像新聞業或是零售業，最後能夠存活的不一定是最肥的那個人，第二許多的保險類種，其中也包含我們所從事的主要險種，銷售通路並非只有唯一管道，所以進入障礙低，今年業績不多，不代表明年就一定會很少，第三閒置的產能，在保險業來說主要是在於人力，這部份並不會造成太大的負擔，在印刷或是鋼鐵業的話就不是如此，我們可以在保持慢速前進的同時，隨時蓄勢待發準備向前衝刺。


We follow a price-based-on-exposure, not-on-competition policy because it makes sense for our shareholders. But we're happy to report that it is also pro-social. This policy means that we are always available, given prices that we believe are adequate, to write huge volumes of almost any type of property-casualty insurance. Many other insurers follow an in-and-out approach. When they are "out" - because of mounting losses, capital inadequacy, or whatever - we are available. Of course, when others are panting to do business we are also available - but at such times we often find ourselves priced above the market. In effect, we supply insurance buyers and brokers with a large reservoir of standby capacity.

我們完全以價格為導向(而非競爭)來決定我們的風險部位，因為如此對於股東投資者才有意義，但同時我們也很高興，因為這對社會同樣也有助益，這個原則代表我們隨時準備就緒，只要市場價格合理，我們願意隨時進場承接任何產物意外險的保單，配合許多保險同業遵循的進出策略，當他們因為損失擴大、資本不足等原因退出市場時，我們隨時可以接替，當然當一些同業進來殺價搶食市場時，雖然我們也願意繼續服務大眾，但由於我們的報價高於市場價格，所以只好暫時退出觀望，基本上我們扮演的是市場供需調節的角色。


One story from mid-1987 illustrates some consequences of our pricing policy: One of the largest family-owned insurance brokers in the country is headed by a fellow who has long been a shareholder of Berkshire. This man handles a number of large risks that are candidates for placement with our New York office. Naturally, he does the best he can for his clients. And, just as naturally, when the insurance market softened dramatically in 1987 he found prices at other insurers lower than we were willing to offer. His reaction was, first, to place all of his business elsewhere and, second, to buy more stock in Berkshire. Had we been really competitive, he said, we would have gotten his insurance business but he would not have bought our stock.

1987年中的一個事件可以充分說明我們的價格政策，在紐約有一家家族經營的保險經紀公司是由一個Berkshire多年資深的老股東所領導，這老兄手上有許多客戶是我們所想要交往的，但基於職業道德他仍然必須為他的客戶爭取到最好的權益，所以當保險市場價格大幅滑落，他發現我們的保費比起其他同業貴了許多時，他第一個反應就是趕快把他客戶的保單從Berkshire轉移到別的保險公司，接下來第二的動作就是買進更多Berkshire的股票，他說要是那一天Berkshire也一樣以降價競爭作為因應，那麼他就會把生意給Berkshire做，但他可能就會把Berkshire的股票賣光。


Berkshire's underwriting experience was excellent in 1987, in part because of the lag factor discussed earlier. Our combined ratio (on a statutory basis and excluding structured settlements and financial reinsurance) was 105. Although the ratio was somewhat less favorable than in 1986, when it was 103, our profitability improved materially in 1987 because we had the use of far more float. This trend will continue to run in our favor: Our ratio of float to premium volume will increase very significantly during the next few years. Thus, Berkshire's insurance profits are quite likely to improve during 1988 and 1989, even though we expect our combined ratio to rise.

Berkshire 1987年的承保表現實在是好極了，一方面是因為先前提到的遞延效應，我們的綜合比率是105(泛指一般保單，不包含私下協議與金融再保部份)，雖然這個數字比起1986年的103來說略微遜色，但我們在1987年的獲利卻由於有更多的浮存金運用而大幅增進，這種好現象將會持續保持，在往後幾年我們浮存金對保費收入的比例還是繼續增加，所以展望Berkshire1988年與1989年的獲利仍將大幅成長，即便綜合比率預估亦會增加。


Our insurance business has also made some important non-financial gains during the last few years. Mike Goldberg, its manager, has assembled a group of talented professionals to write larger risks and unusual coverages. His operation is now well equipped to handle the lines of business that will occasionally offer us major opportunities.

我們的保險事業去年在非財務數字面亦有重大的斬獲，我們組織了一支訓練有素的專業團隊，專門承保特殊钜額的風險，他們已準備好幫助我們處理任何可能遇到龐大的商機。


Our loss reserve development, detailed on pages 41-42, looks better this year than it has previously. But we write lots of "long-tail" business - that is, policies generating claims that often take many years to resolve. Examples would be product liability, or directors and officers liability coverages. With a business mix like this, one year of reserve development tells you very little.

有關損失準備提列的情況，詳附表，今年的狀況比前幾年好一點，但由於我們簽下了許多長期的生意，許多理賠申請可以要花上好幾年才能解決，就像是產品責任保險，或專業經理人責任險，在這種特殊的產業，一年的損失準備其實無法是代表最後結果。


You should be very suspicious of any earnings figures reported by insurers (including our own, as we have unfortunately proved to you in the past). The record of the last decade shows that a great many of our best-known insurers have reported earnings to shareholders that later proved to be wildly erroneous. In most cases, these errors were totally innocent: The unpredictability of our legal system makes it impossible for even the most conscientious insurer to come close to judging the eventual cost of long-tail claims.

大家應該對保險公司的盈餘數字時時抱持懷疑的態度，(當然也包含我們公司本身，事實證明確是如此) ，過去十年來的記錄顯示，有許多顯赫一時的保險公司報告給股東亮麗的盈餘數字最後證明只不過是一場空，在大部分的情況下，這種錯誤是無心的，我們詭譎多變的司法制度，使得就算是最有良知的保險公司都無法準確預測這類長期保險的最終成本。


Nevertheless, auditors annually certify the numbers given them by management and in their opinions unqualifiedly state that these figures "present fairly" the financial position of their clients. The auditors use this reassuring language even though they know from long and painful experience that the numbers so certified are likely to differ dramatically from the true earnings of the period. Despite this history of error, investors understandably rely upon auditors' opinions. After all, a declaration saying that "the statements present fairly" hardly sounds equivocal to the non-accountant.

但奇怪的是，會計師每年就是有辦法為就這些管理階層給的數字背書，並出具無保留的意見表示這些數字允當表達該公司，也就是他們的客戶的財務狀況，而事實上他們自己深知過去慘痛的經驗告訴他們，這些經過驗證的數字與最後可能結算出來的可能會有天壤之別，但卻還是仍然使用這種堅定的語言，而從另一方面來說，就算是歷史殷鑒在前，投資人卻還是相當仰賴會計師的意見，對於會計門外漢來說，他根本就不懂得「該財務報表允當表達」，所代表的真正含意是什麼。


The wording in the auditor's standard opinion letter is scheduled to change next year. The new language represents improvement, but falls far short of describing the limitations of a casualty-insurer audit. If it is to depict the true state of affairs, we believe the standard opinion letter to shareholders of a property-casualty company should read something like: "We have relied upon representations of management in respect to the liabilities shown for losses and loss adjustment expenses, the estimate of which, in turn, very materially affects the earnings and financial condition herein reported. We can express no opinion about the accuracy of these figures. Subject to that important reservation, in our opinion, etc."

會計師標準無保留意見查核報告的遣詞用語在明年將有重大改變，新的用語有相當的改進，但還是很難充分說明產物意外險公司在查核時所受到的限制，如果一個人想要描述一件事情的真相，我們認為給產物意外險公司股東的標準無保留意見報告中應這樣寫︰「我們仰賴管理當局提供損失準備與損失費用調整產生財務報表，而這些估計數位事實上影響公司盈餘與財務狀況甚巨，受限於損失準備的提列先天資訊的不足與我們必須提出的意見，我們完全無法對這些數字的正確性表達看法，等等」


If lawsuits develop in respect to wildly inaccurate financial statements (which they do), auditors will definitely say something of that sort in court anyway. Why should they not be forthright about their role and its limitations from the outset?

假若有人對這種完全不正確的財務報表提出訴訟官司(事實上就有)，會計師一定會在法庭上做類似的辯解，那麼他們為什麼不一開始就坦白地說明他們真實的角色與所受的限制呢?


We want to emphasize that we are not faulting auditors for their inability to accurately assess loss reserves (and therefore earnings). We fault them only for failing to publicly acknowledge that they can't do this job.

我們想要強調的是我們並不是怪罪會計師沒有辦法準確地評估損失準備(當然這會影響到最後的盈餘數字)，我們無法原諒的是他們沒有公開地承認做不到這一點。


From all appearances, the innocent mistakes that are constantly made in reserving are accompanied by others that are deliberate. Various charlatans have enriched themselves at the expense of the investing public by exploiting, first, the inability of auditors to evaluate reserve figures and, second, the auditors' willingness to confidently certify those figures as if they had the expertise to do so. We will continue to see such chicanery in the future. Where "earnings" can be created by the stroke of a pen, the dishonest will gather. For them, long-tail insurance is heaven. The audit wording we suggest would at least serve to put investors on guard against these predators.

從各種不同的角度來看，這種不斷在提列損失準備時所犯無心的錯誤，往往也伴隨著許多故意的過失，許多騙徒就是看准會計師沒有能力評估這些數字，同時又願意配合為這些數字背書，假裝好象他們真的有這個能力，靠著這種方式來欺騙投資大眾賺大錢，在往後的日子我們仍將看到這樣的騙局持續上演，只要大筆一揮，盈餘便可憑空生出，前述我們建議的查核報告措詞，至少可以讓無知的投資人提高警覺避免遭到這些掠食者的坑殺。


The taxes that insurance companies pay - which increased materially, though on a delayed basis, upon enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 - took a further turn for the worse at the end of 1987. We detailed the 1986 changes in last year's report. We also commented on the irony of a statute that substantially increased 1987 reported earnings for insurers even as it materially reduced both their long-term earnings potential and their business value. At Berkshire, the temporarily-helpful "fresh start" adjustment inflated 1987 earnings by $8.2 million.

去年在年報中詳述剛通過的稅負改革法案，使得保險公司支付的稅負以遞延漸進的形式大幅增加，這種情況在1987年更加惡化，諷刺的是雖然這個法案大大地影響到保險公司長期的獲利與價值，卻讓保險公司短期的盈餘數字格外亮麗，光是在Berkshire1987年的盈餘就增加了八百多萬美金。


In our opinion, the 1986 Act was the most important economic event affecting the insurance industry over the past decade. The 1987 Bill further reduced the intercorporate dividends-received credit from 80% to 70%, effective January 1, 1988, except for cases in which the taxpayer owns at least 20% of an investee.

就我們個人的看法，1986年的法案是近十多年來保險業界最重要的經濟事件，1987年的新法案進一步將企業間股利可扣抵的比率由80%減為70%，除非被投資公司有超過20%的股權是由一般投資人所擁有。


Investors who have owned stocks or bonds through corporate intermediaries other than qualified investment companies have always been disadvantaged in comparison to those owning the same securities directly. The penalty applying to indirect ownership was greatly increased by the 1986 Tax Bill and, to a lesser extent, by the 1987 Bill, particularly in instances where the intermediary is an insurance company. We have no way of offsetting this increased level of taxation. It simply means that a given set of pre-tax investment returns will now translate into much poorer after-tax results for our shareholders.

投資人透過中間企業法人(除了專業投資公司外)持有的股份或債券，先天上本來就比直接持有這些有價證券要來的不利的多，尤其是在1986年租稅改革法案通過後，這種租稅懲罰更為明顯，(雖然1987年的情況稍微好轉一點，尤其是對保險公司來說)，我們沒有任何方法可以規避這項增加的稅負成本，簡而言之，現在同樣的稅前獲利，在扣除稅負成本後最後所得到的稅後淨利，要比過去要來得少的多。


All in all, we expect to do well in the insurance business, though our record is sure to be uneven. The immediate outlook is for substantially lower volume but reasonable earnings improvement. The decline in premium volume will accelerate after our quota-share agreement with Fireman's Fund expires in 1989. At some point, likely to be at least a few years away, we may see some major opportunities, for which we are now much better prepared than we were in 1985.

不論如何，我們的保險事業應該可以做的不錯，只是最後的成績可能無法像過去那麼好，目前的展望是保費收入將減少，尤其是消防人員基金在1989年到期後，但盈餘可略微改善，之後我們可能可以再遇到好機會，不過那可能要好幾年以後，屆時我們應該可以作好更萬全的準備。


Marketable Securities - Permanent Holdings

有價證券-永恆的持股


Whenever Charlie and I buy common stocks for Berkshire's insurance companies (leaving aside arbitrage purchases, discussed later) we approach the transaction as if we were buying into a private business. We look at the economic prospects of the business, the people in charge of running it, and the price we must pay. We do not have in mind any time or price for sale. Indeed, we are willing to hold a stock indefinitely so long as we expect the business to increase in intrinsic value at a satisfactory rate. When investing, we view ourselves as business analysts - not as market analysts, not as macroeconomic analysts, and not even as security analysts.

每當查理跟我為Berkshire旗下的保險公司買進股票(扣除套利交易，後面會再詳述)，我們採取的態度就好象是我們買下的是一家私人企業一樣，我們著重於這家公司的經濟前景、經營階層以及我們支付的價格，我們從來就沒有考慮再把這些股份賣出，相反地只要能夠預期這家公司的價值能夠穩定地增加，我們願意無限期地持有這些股份，在投資時我們從不把自己當作是市場的分析師、總體經濟分析師或是證券分析師，而是企業的分析師。


Our approach makes an active trading market useful, since it periodically presents us with mouth-watering opportunities. But by no means is it essential: a prolonged suspension of trading in the securities we hold would not bother us any more than does the lack of daily quotations on World Book or Fechheimer. Eventually, our economic fate will be determined by the economic fate of the business we own, whether our ownership is partial or total.

我門的方式在交易熱絡的股票市場相當管用，因為市場三不五時就會突然浮現令人垂涎三尺的投資機會，但這價格其實並不太重要，因為就算是我們持有的股票停止交易很長一段時間我們也不在意，就像是世界百科全書或是費區海默同樣沒有每天的報價，最後一點，我們的經濟利益取決於我們所擁有的公司本身的經濟利益，不管我們持有的是全部或者是部份股權都一樣。


Ben Graham, my friend and teacher, long ago described the mental attitude toward market fluctuations that I believe to be most conducive to investment success. He said that you should imagine market quotations as coming from a remarkably accommodating fellow named Mr. Market who is your partner in a private business. Without fail, Mr. Market appears daily and names a price at which he will either buy your interest or sell you his.

班哲明．葛拉漢是我的老師，也是我的朋友，很久以前講過一段有關對於市場波動心態的談話，是我認為對於投資獲利最有幫助的一席話，他說投資人可以試著將股票市場的波動當作是一位市場先生每天給你的報價，他就像是一家私人企業的合夥人，不管怎樣，市場先生每天都會報個價格要買下你的股份或是將手中股份賣給你。


Even though the business that the two of you own may have economic characteristics that are stable, Mr. Market's quotations will be anything but. For, sad to say, the poor fellow has incurable emotional problems. At times he feels euphoric and can see only the favorable factors affecting the business. When in that mood, he names a very high buy-sell price because he fears that you will snap up his interest and rob him of imminent gains. At other times he is depressed and can see nothing but trouble ahead for both the business and the world. On these occasions he will name a very low price, since he is terrified that you will unload your interest on him.

即使是你們所共同擁有的合夥企業經營穩定變化不大，市場先生每天還是會固定提出報價，同時市場先生有一個毛病，那就是他的情緒很不穩定，當他高興時，往往只看到合夥企業好的一面，所以為了避免手中的股份被你買走，他會提出一個很高的價格，甚至想要從你手中買下你擁有的股份；但有時候，當他覺得沮喪時，眼中看到的只是這家企業的一堆問題，這時他會提出一個非常低的報價要把股份賣給你，因為他很怕你會將手中的股份塞給他。


Mr. Market has another endearing characteristic: He doesn't mind being ignored. If his quotation is uninteresting to you today, he will be back with a new one tomorrow. Transactions are strictly at your option. Under these conditions, the more manic-depressive his behavior, the better for you.

市場先生還有一個很可愛的特點，那就是他不在乎受到冷落，若今天他提出的報價不被接受，隔天他還是會上門重新報價，要不要交易完全由你自主，所以在這種情況下，他的行為舉止越失措，你可能得到的好處也就越多。


But, like Cinderella at the ball, you must heed one warning or everything will turn into pumpkins and mice: Mr. Market is there to serve you, not to guide you. It is his pocketbook, not his wisdom, that you will find useful. If he shows up some day in a particularly foolish mood, you are free to either ignore him or to take advantage of him, but it will be disastrous if you fall under his influence. Indeed, if you aren't certain that you understand and can value your business far better than Mr. Market, you don't belong in the game. As they say in poker, "If you've been in the game 30 minutes and you don't know who the patsy is, you're the patsy."

但就像辛蒂瑞拉參加的化妝舞會一樣，你務必注意午夜前的鐘響，否則馬車將會變回番瓜，市場先生是來給你服務的，千萬不要受他的誘惑反而被他所導引，你要利用的是他飽飽的口袋，而不是草包般的腦袋，如果他有一天突然傻傻地出現在你面前，你可以選擇視而不見或好好地加以利用，但是要是你占不到他的便宜反而被他愚蠢的想法所吸引，則你的下場可能會很淒慘；事實上若是你沒有把握能夠比市場先生更清楚地衡量企業的價值，你最好不要跟他玩這樣的遊戲，就像是打牌一樣，若是你沒有辦法在30分鐘內看出誰是肉腳，那麼那個肉腳很可能就是你！


Ben's Mr. Market allegory may seem out-of-date in today's investment world, in which most professionals and academicians talk of efficient markets, dynamic hedging and betas. Their interest in such matters is understandable, since techniques shrouded in mystery clearly have value to the purveyor of investment advice. After all, what witch doctor has ever achieved fame and fortune by simply advising "Take two aspirins"?

葛拉漢的市場先生理論在現今的投資世界內或許顯得有些過時，尤其是在那些大談市場效率理論、動態避險與beta值的專家學者眼中更是如此，他們會對那些深奧的課題感到興趣是可以理解的，因為這對於渴望投資建議的追求者來說，是相當具吸引力的，就像是沒有一位名醫可以單靠「吃兩顆阿斯匹寧」這類簡單有效的建議成名致富的。




The value of market esoterica to the consumer of investment advice is a different story. In my opinion, investment success will not be produced by arcane formulae, computer programs or signals flashed by the price behavior of stocks and markets. Rather an investor will succeed by coupling good business judgment with an ability to insulate his thoughts and behavior from the super-contagious emotions that swirl about the marketplace. In my own efforts to stay insulated, I have found it highly useful to keep Ben's Mr. Market concept firmly in mind.

這當然是股市秘笈存在的價值，但就我個人的看法，投資成功不是靠晦澀難解的公式、電腦運算或是股票行情板上股票上下的跳動，相反地投資人要能成功，惟有憑藉著優異的商業判斷同時避免自己的想法、行為，受到容易煽動人心的市場情緒所影響，以我個人的經驗來說，要能夠免除市場誘惑，最好的方法就是將葛拉漢的市場先生理論銘記在心。


Following Ben's teachings, Charlie and I let our marketable equities tell us by their operating results - not by their daily, or even yearly, price quotations - whether our investments are successful. The market may ignore business success for a while, but eventually will confirm it. As Ben said: "In the short run, the market is a voting machine but in the long run it is a weighing machine." The speed at which a business's success is recognized, furthermore, is not that important as long as the company's intrinsic value is increasing at a satisfactory rate. In fact, delayed recognition can be an advantage: It may give us the chance to buy more of a good thing at a bargain price.

追隨葛拉漢的教誨，查理跟我著眼的是投資組合本身的經營成果，以此來判斷投資是否成功，而不是他們每天或是每年的股價變化，短期間市場或許會忽略一家經營成功的企業，但最後這些公司終將獲得市場的肯定，就像葛拉漢所說的：「短期而言，股票市場是一個投票機，但長期來說，它卻是一個體重機」一家成功的公司是否很快地就被發現並不是重點，重要的是只要這家公司的內在價值能夠以穩定地速度成長才是關鍵，事實上越晚被發現有時好處更多，因為我們就有更多的機會以便宜的價格買進它的股份。


Sometimes, of course, the market may judge a business to be more valuable than the underlying facts would indicate it is. In such a case, we will sell our holdings. Sometimes, also, we will sell a security that is fairly valued or even undervalued because we require funds for a still more undervalued investment or one we believe we understand better.

當然有時市場也會高估一家企業的價值，在這種情況下，我們會考慮把股份出售，另外有時雖然公司股價合理或甚至略微低估，但若是我們發現有更被低估的投資標的或是我們覺得比較熟悉瞭解的公司時，我們也會考慮出售股份。


We need to emphasize, however, that we do not sell holdings just because they have appreciated or because we have held them for a long time. (Of Wall Street maxims the most foolish may be "You can't go broke taking a profit.") We are quite content to hold any security indefinitely, so long as the prospective return on equity capital of the underlying business is satisfactory, management is competent and honest, and the market does not overvalue the business.

然而我們必須強調的是我們不會因為被投資公司的股價上漲或是因為我們已經持有一段時間，就把它們給處分掉，在華爾街名言中，最可笑的莫過於是「賺錢的人是不會破產的」，我們很願意無限期的持有一家公司的股份，只要這家公司所運用的資金可以產生令人滿意的報酬、管理階層優秀能幹且正直，同時市場對於其股價沒有過度的高估。


However, our insurance companies own three marketable common stocks that we would not sell even though they became far overpriced in the market. In effect, we view these investments exactly like our successful controlled businesses - a permanent part of Berkshire rather than merchandise to be disposed of once Mr. Market offers us a sufficiently high price. To that, I will add one qualifier: These stocks are held by our insurance companies and we would, if absolutely necessary, sell portions of our holdings to pay extraordinary insurance losses. We intend, however, to manage our affairs so that sales are never required.

但是這不包含我們保險公司所擁有的三家企業，即使它們的股價再怎麼漲，我們也不會賣，事實上我們把這些投資與前面那些具控制權的公司一樣地看待，它們不像是一般的商品可以賣來賣去，反而像是Berkshire企業的一部份，不管市場先生提出再怎麼高的天價也一樣，只是在此我要加一條但書，除非因為我們的保險公司發生钜額虧損，必須出售部份的持股來彌補虧損，當然我們會盡所能避免這種情況發生。


A determination to have and to hold, which Charlie and I share, obviously involves a mixture of personal and financial considerations. To some, our stand may seem highly eccentric. (Charlie and I have long followed David Oglivy's advice: "Develop your eccentricities while you are young. That way, when you get old, people won't think you're going ga-ga.") Certainly, in the transaction-fixated Wall Street of recent years, our posture must seem odd: To many in that arena, both companies and stocks are seen only as raw material for trades.

當然查理跟我決定要擁有並持有一家公司的股份，是同時綜合了個人想法與財務方面的考量，對某些人來說，我們這樣的做法可能有點不合常規，(查理跟我長期以來一直遵從奧美廣告創辦人�大衛奧美的建議，在年輕時發展出你自己的特異風格，這樣子等你到老時，人們就不會覺得你是個怪胎)，的確，近年來在交易頻繁的華爾街，我們的態度看起來有些特立獨行，在那個競技場內，所有的公司與股份，都不過是交易的籌碼而已。



Our attitude, however, fits our personalities and the way we want to live our lives. Churchill once said, "You shape your houses and then they shape you." We know the manner in which we wish to be shaped. For that reason, we would rather achieve a return of X while associating with people whom we strongly like and admire than realize 110% of X by exchanging these relationships for uninteresting or unpleasant ones. And we will never find people we like and admire more than some of the main participants at the three companies - our permanent holdings - shown below:

但是我們的態度完全符合我們本身的人格特質，這就是我們想要過的生活，邱吉爾曾經說過，我們很清楚我們要如何去塑造我們想要的模式，因此我們寧願跟我們喜歡與推崇的物件往來，就算是因此，會比跟一些我們討厭或是不喜歡的人打交道，少得到一些投資報酬也沒有關係，我想我們是大概不可能再遇到像這三家主要的被投資公司組成份子一樣，令我們所喜愛與推崇。以下所列就是我們永恆的持股：




No. of Shares Cost Market------------- ---------- ----------(000s omitted)
3,000,000 Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. ........... $517,500 $1,035,000
6,850,000 GEICO Corporation .................. 45,713 756,925
1,727,765 The Washington Post Company ........9,731 323,092

We really don't see many fundamental differences between the purchase of a controlled business and the purchase of marketable holdings such as these. In each case we try to buy into businesses with favorable long-term economics. Our goal is to find an outstanding business at a sensible price, not a mediocre business at a bargain price. Charlie and I have found that making silk purses out of silk is the best that we can do; with sow's ears, we fail.

在這些公司上，我們實在看不出買下並控制一家企業或是購買部份股權有什麼基本上的差異，每次我們都試著買進一些長期看好的公司，我們的目標是以合理的價格買到績優的企業，而不是以便宜的價格買進平庸的公司，查理跟我發現買到貨真價實的東西才是我們真正應該做的。


(It must be noted that your Chairman, always a quick study, required only 20 years to recognize how important it was to buy good businesses. In the interim, I searched for "bargains" - and had the misfortune to find some. My punishment was an education in the economics of short-line farm implement manufacturers, third-place department stores, and New England textile manufacturers.)

必須特別注意的是，本人雖然以反應快速著稱，不過卻花了二十年才明白要買下好企業的重要性，剛開始我努力尋找便宜的貨色，不幸的是真的讓我找到了一些，所得到的教訓是在農具機械、三流百貨公司與新英格蘭紡織工廠等經濟形態上上了一課。


Of course, Charlie and I may misread the fundamental economics of a business. When that happens, we will encounter problems whether that business is a wholly-owned subsidiary or a marketable security, although it is usually far easier to exit from the latter. (Indeed, businesses can be misread: Witness the European reporter who, after being sent to this country to profile Andrew Carnegie, cabled his editor, "My God, you'll never believe the sort of money there is in running libraries.")

當然查理跟我確實會誤判一家企業的基礎競爭力，結果是我們面臨了一大堆問題與挑戰，不管是買下全部或是部份的股權，當然後者要脫身相對容易一點，(確實企業很可能會被誤判，一位元歐洲記者被派駐到美國採訪卡內基，發了一封電報給他的編輯主管說到，老天你一定不敢相信經營博物館竟然可以賺那麼多錢)


In making both control purchases and stock purchases, we try to buy not only good businesses, but ones run by high-grade, talented and likeable managers. If we make a mistake about the managers we link up with, the controlled company offers a certain advantage because we have the power to effect change. In practice, however, this advantage is somewhat illusory: Management changes, like marital changes, are painful, time-consuming and chancy. In any event, at our three marketable-but permanent holdings, this point is moot: With Tom Murphy and Dan Burke at Cap Cities, Bill Snyder and Lou Simpson at GEICO, and Kay Graham and Dick Simmons at The Washington Post, we simply couldn't be in better hands.

在進行取得控制權或是部份股權投資時，我們不但試著去找一家好公司，同時最好是能夠由品格才能兼具且為我們喜愛的管理者經營，如果是看錯了人，在具控制權的情況下，我們還有機會發揮影響力來改變，事實上這種優勢有點不太實際，因為更換管理階層，就像是結束婚姻關係一樣，過程是相當地費時痛苦且要看運氣，不論如何，我們三家永恆的股權投資在這點是不太可能發生的，有Tom Murphy 和Dan Burke 在資本城, Bill Snyder 和 Lou Simpson 在蓋可保險 Kay Graham 和Dick Simmons 在華盛頓郵報，我們實在想不出有更有的接替人選。


I would say that the controlled company offers two main advantages. First, when we control a company we get to allocate capital, whereas we are likely to have little or nothing to say about this process with marketable holdings. This point can be important because the heads of many companies are not skilled in capital allocation. Their inadequacy is not surprising. Most bosses rise to the top because they have excelled in an area such as marketing, production, engineering, administration or, sometimes, institutional politics.

我必須說明控制一家公司有二個主要的優點，首先當我們控制一家公司我們便有分配資金與資源的權力，相較之下，若是部份股權投資則完全沒有說話的餘地，這點非常重要，因為大部分的公司經營者，並不擅長於做資金分配，之所以如此並不讓人訝異，因為大部分的老闆之所以能夠成功是靠著他們在行銷、生產、工程、行政管理方面的專長。


Once they become CEOs, they face new responsibilities. They now must make capital allocation decisions, a critical job that they may have never tackled and that is not easily mastered. To stretch the point, it's as if the final step for a highly-talented musician was not to perform at Carnegie Hall but, instead, to be named Chairman of the Federal Reserve.

而一旦成為CEO之後，他們馬上必須面臨許多新的責任與挑戰，包括要做資金分配的決策，這是一項他們以前從未面對艱巨且重要的任務，打個比方，這就好象是一位深具天分的音樂家，沒有安排讓他到卡內基音樂廳演奏，卻反而任命他為聯邦準備理事會主席一般。


The lack of skill that many CEOs have at capital allocation is no small matter: After ten years on the job, a CEO whose company annually retains earnings equal to 10% of net worth will have been responsible for the deployment of more than 60% of all the capital at work in the business.

CEO缺乏資金分配的能力可不是一件小事，一家公司若是每年保留10%的盈餘在公司的話，經過十年後，他所要掌管的資金等於增加了60%。


CEOs who recognize their lack of capital-allocation skills (which not all do) will often try to compensate by turning to their staffs, management consultants, or investment bankers. Charlie and I have frequently observed the consequences of such "help." On balance, we feel it is more likely to accentuate the capital-allocation problem than to solve it.

某些體認到自己缺乏這方面能力的CEO(當然也有很多不這樣認為)，會轉向部屬、管理顧問或是投資銀行家尋求建議，查理跟我時常觀察這種幫忙最後的結果，總的來說，我們認為大多數的情況並不能解決問題，反而是讓問題變得更嚴重。


In the end, plenty of unintelligent capital allocation takes place in corporate America. (That's why you hear so much about "restructuring.") Berkshire, however, has been fortunate. At the companies that are our major non-controlled holdings, capital has generally been well-deployed and, in some cases, brilliantly so.

結果你就會發現在美國企業一大堆不明智的資本分配決策一再重複的發生(這也是為什麼你常常聽到組織重整再造的原因)，然而在Berkshire我們算是比較幸運，在一家我們不具控制權的股權投資方面，大部分的公司資金運用還算得當，有的甚至還相當的傑出。


The second advantage of a controlled company over a marketable security has to do with taxes. Berkshire, as a corporate holder, absorbs some significant tax costs through the ownership of partial positions that we do not when our ownership is 80%, or greater. Such tax disadvantages have long been with us, but changes in the tax code caused them to increase significantly during the past year. As a consequence, a given business result can now deliver Berkshire financial results that are as much as 50% better if they come from an 80%-or-greater holding rather than from a lesser holding.

第二項優點是相較於部份投資，取得控制權的投資享有租稅上的優惠，Berkshire身為一家控股公司，在投資部份股權時，必須吸收相當大的租稅成本，相較之下，持有控制股權的投資則沒有這種情況，這種租稅弱勢發生在我們身上由來已久，但過去幾年的稅法修訂，使得這種情形更雪上加霜，同樣的獲利，若發生在我們持有80%以上股權的公司，要比其他部份股權投資的效益要高出50%以上。


The disadvantages of owning marketable securities are sometimes offset by a huge advantage: Occasionally the stock market offers us the chance to buy non-controlling pieces of extraordinary businesses at truly ridiculous prices -dramatically below those commanded in negotiated transactions that transfer control. For example, we purchased our Washington Post stock in 1973 at $5.63 per share, and per-share operating earnings in 1987 after taxes were $10.30. Similarly, Our GEICO stock was purchased in 1976, 1979 and 1980 at an average of $6.67 per share, and after-tax operating earnings per share last year were $9.01. In cases such as these, Mr. Market has proven to be a mighty good friend.

不過這種劣勢有時可以由另一項優勢所抵消掉，有時候股票市場讓我們可以以不可思議的價格買到績優公司部份的股權，遠低於協議買下整家公司取得控制權的平均價格，舉例來說，我們在1973年以每股5.63元買下華盛頓郵報的股票，該公司在1987年的每股盈餘是10.3元，同樣地，我們分別在1976、1979與1980年以每股6.67元的平均價格買下蓋可保險的部份股權，到了去年其每股稅後的營業利益是9.01元，從這些情況看來，市場先生實在是一位非常大方的好朋友。


An interesting accounting irony overlays a comparison of the reported financial results of our controlled companies with those of the permanent minority holdings listed above. As you can see, those three stocks have a market value of over $2 billion. Yet they produced only $11 million in reported after-tax earnings for Berkshire in 1987.

一個矛盾又有趣的會計現象，從上面的表你可以看到，我們在這三家公司的股權投資市值超過20億，但是他們在1987年總共貢獻給Berkshire帳面稅後盈餘卻只有一千一百萬美元。


Accounting rules dictate that we take into income only the dividends these companies pay us - which are little more than nominal - rather than our share of their earnings, which in 1987 amounted to well over $100 million. On the other hand, accounting rules provide that the carrying value of these three holdings - owned, as they are, by insurance companies - must be recorded on our balance sheet at current market prices. The result: GAAP accounting lets us reflect in our net worth the up-to-date underlying values of the businesses we partially own, but does not let us reflect their underlying earnings in our income account.

會計原則規定我們必須在這些公司分配股利的時候才能認列利益，這通常要比公司實際所賺的數字要少的多，以這三家公司合計，1987年可以分配到的盈餘數字高達一億美元，另一方面，會計原則規定這三家公司的股份若是有保險公司所持有，則其帳面價值應該要以其市場價格列示，結果是一般公認會計原則要求我們在資產負債表上秀出這些被投資事業的實際價值，卻不准讓我們在損益表是反應他們實質的獲利能力。


In the case of our controlled companies, just the opposite is true. Here, we show full earnings in our income account but never change asset values on our balance sheet, no matter how much the value of a business might have increased since we purchased it.

在我們具有控制權的投資事業，情況卻剛好相反，我們可以在損益表上充分表示其獲利狀況，但不管這些資產在我們買下之後，價值在無形間如何地增加，我們也無法在資產負債表上做任何的變動。


Our mental approach to this accounting schizophrenia is to ignore GAAP figures and to focus solely on the future earning power of both our controlled and non-controlled businesses. Using this approach, we establish our own ideas of business value, keeping these independent from both the accounting values shown on our books for controlled companies and the values placed by a sometimes foolish market on our partially-owned companies. It is this business value that we hope to increase at a reasonable (or, preferably, unreasonable) rate in the years ahead.

我們對於這種會計精神分裂症的調整心態方式就是不去理會一般公認會計原則所編制的數位，而只專注於這些具控制權或者是部份股權的公司，其未來的獲利能力，採用這種方法，我們依自己的概念建立一套企業價值的評價模式，它有別于會計帳上所顯示的具控制權的帳面投資成本以及有的時候高的離譜的部份股權投資市值，這才是我們真正想要在未來年度持續穩定增加的數字(當然若能以不合理的速度成長的話更好)。


Marketable Securities – Other

其他有價證券


In addition to our three permanent common stock holdings, we hold large quantities of marketable securities in our insurance companies. In selecting these, we can choose among five major categories: (1) long-term common stock investments, (2) medium-term fixed-income securities, (3) long-term fixed income securities, (4) short-term cash equivalents, and (5) short-term arbitrage commitments.

除了上述的三家重要投資事業，我們的保險公司也持有大量的有價證券，主要可以分為五個類型，分別為：(1)長期股票投資(2)長期固定收益債券(3)中期固定收益債券(4)短期約當現金(5)短期套利交易


We have no particular bias when it comes to choosing from these categories. We just continuously search among them for the highest after-tax returns as measured by "mathematical expectation," limiting ourselves always to investment alternatives we think we understand. Our criteria have nothing to do with maximizing immediately reportable earnings; our goal, rather, is to maximize eventual net worth.

對於這五種類型的交易，我們沒有特別的偏好，我們只是持續不斷地尋找最高的稅後報酬預計的數學期望值，且僅限於我們認為瞭解熟悉的投資，我們無意讓與短期的帳面盈餘好看，我們的目標是讓長期的淨值極大化。


Let's look first at common stocks. During 1987 the stock market was an area of much excitement but little net movement: The Dow advanced 2.3% for the year. You are aware, of course, of the roller coaster ride that produced this minor change. Mr. Market was on a manic rampage until October and then experienced a sudden, massive seizure.

首先談談普通股投資，1987年股市的表現精彩連連，但最後指數卻沒有太大的進展，道瓊整個年度只漲了2.3%，你知道這就好象是在坐雲霄飛車一樣，市場先生在十月以前爆跳如雷，但之後卻突然收斂了下來。


We have "professional" investors, those who manage many billions, to thank for most of this turmoil. Instead of focusing on what businesses will do in the years ahead, many prestigious money managers now focus on what they expect other money managers to do in the days ahead. For them, stocks are merely tokens in a game, like the thimble and flatiron in Monopoly.

市場上有所謂專業的投資人，掌管著數以億萬計的資金，就是這些人造成市場的動盪，他們不去研究企業下一步發展的方向，反而專研于其他基金經理人下一步的動向，對他們來說，股票只不過是賭博交易的籌碼，就像是大富翁裏的棋子一樣。


An extreme example of what their attitude leads to is "portfolio insurance," a money-management strategy that many leading investment advisors embraced in 1986-1987. This strategy - which is simply an exotically-labeled version of the small speculator's stop-loss order dictates that ever increasing portions of a stock portfolio, or their index-future equivalents, be sold as prices decline. The strategy says nothing else matters: A downtick of a given magnitude automatically produces a huge sell order. According to the Brady Report, $60 billion to $90 billion of equities were poised on this hair trigger in mid-October of 1987.

他們的做法發展到極致，便形成所謂的投資組合保險，一個在1986到1987年間廣為基金經理人所接受的一種策略，這種策略只不過是像投機者停損單一樣，當投資組合或是類似指數期貨價格下跌時就必須處分持股，這種策略不管如此，只要下跌到一定程度便會湧出一大堆賣單，根據一份研究報告顯示：有高達600億到900億的股票投資在1987年十月中面臨一觸即發的險境。


If you've thought that investment advisors were hired to invest, you may be bewildered by this technique. After buying a farm, would a rational owner next order his real estate agent to start selling off pieces of it whenever a neighboring property was sold at a lower price? Or would you sell your house to whatever bidder was available at 9:31 on some morning merely because at 9:30 a similar house sold for less than it would have brought on the previous day?

若是你認為投資顧問是被請來投資的，那你就大錯特錯了，在買下一家農場後，一個理性的主人會不會叫其不動產經紀人開始尋求可能的買主，只因為隔壁的農場最近賣出的價格更低一些?或是你會不會一早起來就想要把你的房子賣掉，只因為幾分鐘前你聽到隔壁的房子以比以前便宜的價格脫手。


Moves like that, however, are what portfolio insurance tells a pension fund or university to make when it owns a portion of enterprises such as Ford or General Electric. The less these companies are being valued at, says this approach, the more vigorously they should be sold. As a "logical" corollary, the approach commands the institutions to repurchase these companies - I'm not making this up - once their prices have rebounded significantly. Considering that huge sums are controlled by managers following such Alice-in-Wonderland practices, is it any surprise that markets sometimes behave in aberrational fashion?

這樣的舉動正是投資組合風險理論告訴退休基金或是學術單位當他們持有福特或是通用電氣部份股權時，應該要做的動作，因為這些公司的價值越被低估，你就越應該趕快把他們處分掉，根據邏輯推論，這種方法還要求投資機構在股價反彈時再把他們買回來，一想到有這麼多的資金，掌握在整天沉溺在愛莉絲夢遊仙境般的經理人手中，也難怪股票市場會有如此不尋常的表現。


Many commentators, however, have drawn an incorrect conclusion upon observing recent events: They are fond of saying that the small investor has no chance in a market now dominated by the erratic behavior of the big boys. This conclusion is dead wrong: Such markets are ideal for any investor - small or large - so long as he sticks to his investment knitting. Volatility caused by money managers who speculate irrationally with huge sums will offer the true investor more chances to make intelligent investment moves. He can be hurt by such volatility only if he is forced, by either financial or psychological pressures, to sell at untoward times.

然而許多評論家在觀察最近所發生的事時，歸納出一個不正確的結論，他們喜歡說由於股票市場掌握在這些投資大戶手上，所以小額投資人根本一點機會也沒有，這種結論實在是大大地錯誤，不管資金多寡，這樣的市場絕對有利於任何投資者，只要他能夠堅持自己的投資理念，事實上由手握重金的基金經理人所造成的市場波動，反而使得真正的投資人有更好的機會可以去貫徹其明智的投資行動，只要他在面臨股市波動時，不會因為財務或心理因素而被迫在不當的時機出脫手中持股，他就很難會受到傷害。


At Berkshire, we have found little to do in stocks during the past few years. During the break in October, a few stocks fell to prices that interested us, but we were unable to make meaningful purchases before they rebounded. At yearend 1987 we had no major common stock investments (that is, over $50 million) other than those we consider permanent or arbitrage holdings. However, Mr. Market will offer us opportunities - you can be sure of that - and, when he does, we will be willing and able to participate.

在Berkshire過去幾年，我們在股票市場實在沒有什麼可以發揮的地方，在十月的那段期間，有幾支股票跌到相當吸引我們的價位，不過我們沒有能夠在他們反彈之前買到夠多的股份，在1987年底除了永久的持股與短期的套利之外，我們並沒有新增任何主要的股票投資組合(指5,000萬美元以上)，不過你大可以放心，一旦市場先生一定會給我們機會的時候，我們一定會好好把握住的。


In the meantime, our major parking place for money is medium-term tax-exempt bonds, whose limited virtues I explained in last year's annual report. Though we both bought and sold some of these bonds in 1987, our position changed little overall, holding around $900 million. A large portion of our bonds are "grandfathered" under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which means they are fully tax-exempt. Bonds currently purchased by insurance companies are not.

至於我們主要的資金避風港-中期的免稅債券，在去年我已經解釋過其特點，雖然在1987年間我們也有進出，但整個部位變化不大，總金額約在9億美元左右，大部分的債券是屬於1986年稅務改革法案中祖父級的債券，不同於現在保險公司新買進的債券，他們享有百分之百免稅的優惠。


As an alternative to short-term cash equivalents, our medium-term tax-exempts have - so far served us well. They have produced substantial extra income for us and are currently worth a bit above our cost. Regardless of their market price, we are ready to dispose of our bonds whenever something better comes along.

當作短期約當現金的替代品，中期免稅債券的表現還算不錯，他們貢獻了不少額外的投資報酬，且目前的價值也略高於我們當初投資的成本，但不管之後他們的市價高或低，只要我們找到更好的投資機會，我們隨時都有可能把他們給處分掉。


We continue to have an aversion to long-term bonds (and may be making a serious mistake by not disliking medium-term bonds as well). Bonds are no better than the currency in which they are denominated, and nothing we have seen in the past year - or past decade - makes us enthusiastic about the long-term future of U.S. currency.

我們持續避免去碰長期債券(也有可能因為沒有對中期免稅債券保持距離而犯下大錯)，債券沒有比他們表彰的貨幣來得好，在過去十年以即可預見的未來，我們看不出我們會對美國債券有太大的興趣。


Our enormous trade deficit is causing various forms of "claim checks" - U.S. government and corporate bonds, bank deposits, etc. - to pile up in the hands of foreigners at a distressing rate. By default, our government has adopted an approach to its finances patterned on that of Blanche DuBois, of A Streetcar Named Desire, who said, "I have always depended on the kindness of strangers." In this case, of course, the "strangers" are relying on the integrity of our claim checks although the plunging dollar has already made that proposition expensive for them.

我們钜額的貿易逆差，使得我們必須面臨許多不同形式的支票帳單，這包含外國人持有的美國政府與企業公債、銀行存款等，以驚人的速度累積成長，一開始我們的政府所採取的方式，就像是欲望街車的角色布蘭奇所說的，我總是依賴陌生人的同情心而活，當然本案的陌生人依靠的主要是債務人的可靠性，雖然貶值的美元也讓他們必須付出高昂的代價。


The faith that foreigners are placing in us may be misfounded. When the claim checks outstanding grow sufficiently numerous and when the issuing party can unilaterally determine their purchasing power, the pressure on the issuer to dilute their value by inflating the currency becomes almost irresistible. For the debtor government, the weapon of inflation is the economic equivalent of the "H" bomb, and that is why very few countries have been allowed to swamp the world with debt denominated in their own currency. Our past, relatively good record for fiscal integrity has let us break this rule, but the generosity accorded us is likely to intensify, rather than relieve, the eventual pressure on us to inflate. If we do succumb to that pressure, it won't be just the foreign holders of our claim checks who will suffer. It will be all of us as well.

外國人對我們的信心可能有點所托非人，因為當要付的支票帳單持續的增加，而債務人又能夠無限制地主導自己的購買能力時，美鈔發行人增加流通貨幣來稀釋其貨幣價值的情況鐵定會發生，對於債務國政府來說，通貨膨脹這項武器就好象是經濟戰爭中威力強大的氫彈一樣，很少有國家可以讓全世界充斥著以自己貨幣計價的債券，不過由於我們國家過去不錯的財政記錄，使得我們能夠打破這項限制，只是這樣的寬容使得我們通膨的壓力只會增加不會減少，而一旦我們屈服於這樣的壓力，不只是持有美國債權的外國人遭殃，連帶的我們也會受到影響。


Of course, the U.S. may take steps to stem our trade deficit well before our position as a net debtor gets out of hand. (In that respect, the falling dollar will help, though unfortunately it will hurt in other ways.) Nevertheless, our government's behavior in this test of its mettle is apt to be consistent with its Scarlett O'Hara approach generally: "I'll think about it tomorrow." And, almost inevitably, procrastination in facing up to fiscal problems will have inflationary consequences.

當然在債務問題失控之前，美國政府也會試著採取一些方法來抑制貿易逆差，(有關於這點，下滑的美元匯率或許會有幫助，只是同樣地它又會造成另一種傷害)，目前我們政府的做法跟亂世佳人裏郝思佳的態度差不多一樣，「明天再想辦法吧!」，而幾乎無可避免的對於財政問題的處理耽擱將會造成通貨膨脹的後果。


Both the timing and the sweep of those consequences are unpredictable. But our inability to quantify or time the risk does not mean we should ignore it. While recognizing the possibility that we may be wrong and that present interest rates may adequately compensate for the inflationary risk, we retain a general fear of long-term bonds.

只是這些後果發生的時點與影響我們實在無從去預測，不過無法去量化或是鎖定這種風險不代表我們就可以忽視它的存在，當然我們的推論也許會不準確，目前的利率水準或可彌補通貨膨脹所帶來的損失，只是我們對於長期的債券仍報以持續的戒心。


We are, however, willing to invest a moderate portion of our funds in this category if we think we have a significant edge in a specific security. That willingness explains our holdings of the Washington Public Power Supply Systems #1, #2 and #3 issues, discussed in our 1984 report. We added to our WPPSS position during 1987. At yearend, we had holdings with an amortized cost of $240 million and a market value of $316 million, paying us tax-exempt income of $34 million annually.

然而我們仍願意把一部份資金擺在這上頭，如果在某些特定的有價證券上有特殊的利益，就像是我在1984年年報中曾經提到我們在華盛頓公用電力系統債券上的投資，在1987年我們又持續加碼投資，總計到年底我們持有的這類帳面未攤銷成本為2.4億美元債券，市價約為3.16億美元，還外加每年三千四百萬美元的免稅利息收入。


We continued to do well in arbitrage last year, though - or perhaps because - we operated on a very limited scale. We enter into only a few arbitrage commitments each year and restrict ourselves to large transactions that have been publicly announced. We do not participate in situations in which green-mailers are attempting to put a target company "in play."

我們持續在短期套利交易上有所斬獲，雖然我們從事的規模有限，每年我們限制自己只專注在幾個少數已公開信息的大型交易案，我們不介入那些已被投機套利客鎖定的個案。


We have practiced arbitrage on an opportunistic basis for decades and, to date, our results have been quite good. Though we've never made an exact calculation, I believe that overall we have averaged annual pre-tax returns of at least 25% from arbitrage. I'm quite sure we did better than that in 1987. But it should be emphasized that a really bad experience or two - such as many arbitrage operations suffered in late 1987 - could change the figures dramatically.

我們從事機率套利已有好幾十年的經驗，到目前為止，我們的成果還算不錯，雖然我們從來沒有仔細去算過，我相信我們在套利投資方面的稅前年報酬率應該有25%左右，我確信1987年的成績甚至比以前好的多，但必須強調的是只要發生一、兩次像今年其他幾個套利慘痛的經驗，就可能使得整個結果豬羊變色。


Our only $50 million-plus arbitrage position at yearend 1987 was 1,096,200 shares of Allegis, with a cost of $76 million and a market value of $78 million.

今年我們新增5,000萬美元以上的套利案只有斥資7,600萬美元投資100萬股Allegis，目前的市價約為7,800萬美元。


We had two other large holdings at yearend that do not fit precisely into any of our five categories. One was various Texaco, Inc. bonds with short maturities, all purchased after Texaco went into bankruptcy. Were it not for the extraordinarily strong capital position of our insurance companies, it would be inappropriate for us to buy defaulted bonds. At prices prevailing after Texaco's bankruptcy filing, however, we regarded these issues as by far the most attractive bond investment available to us.

我們在年底還有其他二個主要的投資組合不在前述五個範圍之內，一項是Texaco短期債券，全都是在它破產之後才買進，要不是因為我們旗下保險公司的財務實力雄厚，我們實在不太適合去買這種已發生問題的債券，不過以這些債券在Texaco倒閉後的低廉價格，這是目前我們可以找得到最吸引我們的投資標的。


On a worst-case basis with respect to the Pennzoil litigation, we felt the bonds were likely to be worth about what we paid for them. Given a sensible settlement, which seemed likely, we expected the bonds to be worth considerably more. At yearend our Texaco bonds were carried on our books at $104 million and had a market value of $119 million.

考量其所牽涉的訴訟案件，在最壞的情況之下，我們認為應該還是可以將投資成本回收，而若是官司可以和解收場，我們預期債券的價值將會更高，截至年底Texaco債券在我們帳面上的成本約為一億美元，目前的市值則約為1.2億美元。


By far our largest - and most publicized - investment in 1987 was a $700 million purchase of Salomon Inc 9% preferred stock. This preferred is convertible after three years into Salomon common stock at $38 per share and, if not converted, will be redeemed ratably over five years beginning October 31, 1995. From most standpoints, this commitment fits into the medium-term fixed-income securities category. In addition, we have an interesting conversion possibility. (※※ ）





We, of course, have no special insights regarding the direction or future profitability of investment banking. By their nature, the economics of this industry are far less predictable than those of most other industries in which we have major Commitments. This unpredictability is one of the reasons why our participation is in the form of a convertible preferred.

在投資銀行業，我們當然沒有特殊的遠見能夠預知其未來發展的方向與獲利能力，就產業特性而言，投資銀行業比起我們其他主要投資的行業更難預測，這也是為什麼我們選擇以可轉換特別股的方式投資。


What we do have a strong feeling about is the ability and integrity of John Gutfreund, CEO of Salomon Inc. Charlie and I like, admire and trust John. We first got to know him in 1976 when he played a key role in GEICO's escape from near-bankruptcy. Several times since, we have seen John steer clients away from transactions that would have been unwise, but that the client clearly wanted to make - even though his advice provided no fee to Salomon and acquiescence would have delivered a large fee. Such service-above-self behavior is far from automatic in Wall Street.

當然我們對於所羅門公司的CEO -John Gutfreund的能力與品格有不錯的印象，查理與我都很尊崇且信賴他，我們是在1976年開始認識他，當時他在協助GEICO汽車保險免於破產的命運時出了不少力，之後我們看到他好幾次引導客戶免于愚蠢的交易，雖然這使得所羅門因此損失許多顧問費收入，這種以客戶服務至上的表現在華爾街並不多見。


For the reasons Charlie outlines on page 50, at yearend we valued our Salomon investment at 98% of par, $14 million less than our cost. However, we believe there is a reasonable likelihood that a leading, high-quality capital-raising and market-making operation can average good returns on equity. If so, our conversion right will eventually prove to be valuable.

如同查理在50頁上所陳述的理由，截至年底我們將在所羅門公司的投資價值定在面額的98%，大約比我們的投資成本少1,400萬，不過我們仍然相信這家公司在高品質資本籌募與市場創造營運，將可為我們的投資創造不錯的盈餘，若果真如此，我們可轉換為股權的權利將會非常有價值。


Two further comments about our investments in marketable securities are appropriate. First, we give you our usual warning: Our holdings have changed since yearend and will continue to do so without notice.

最後關於我們有價證券的投資再補充兩點，第一照例我還是給諸位一個提醒，相較於去年底的持股內容，我們現在的投資組合又有變動，而且在沒有知會大家的情況下，還會繼續變動。


The second comment is related: During 1987, as in some earlier years, there was speculation in the press from time to time about our purchase or sale of various securities. These stories were sometimes true, sometimes partially true, and other times completely untrue. Interestingly, there has been no correlation between the size and prestige of the publication and the accuracy of the report. One dead-wrong rumor was given considerable prominence by a major national magazine, and another leading publication misled its readers by writing about an arbitrage position as if it were a long-term investment commitment. (In not naming names, I am observing the old warning that it's not wise to pick fights with people who buy ink by the barrel.)

這二點跟前面也有相關，跟前幾年一樣，在1987年媒體不時在猜測我們進出的投資標的，這些報導有時是真的，有時是半真半假，有時根本就不是事實，有趣的是，我發現媒體的規模與聲譽和報導的真實性一點相關都沒有，曾經有一家全美舉足輕重的媒體雜誌刊登一項完全錯誤的謠言，另外一家出版業者則將一樁短期的套利投資誤當做是一項長期的投資，(之所以沒有公佈名字，是因為古有名訓，遇到整桶整桶買墨水的人，最好不要跟他發生爭吵)


You should understand that we simply don't comment in any way on rumors, whether they are true or false. If we were to deny the incorrect reports and refuse comment on the correct ones, we would in effect be commenting on all.

大家應該知道我們從來不會對任何的謠言加以評論，不管是真或是假，因為若是我們否認不實的報導，或是拒絕對真實的事件發表評論，都等於間接表達了我們的立場。


In a world in which big investment ideas are both limited and valuable, we have no interest in telling potential competitors what we are doing except to the extent required by law. We certainly don't expect others to tell us of their investment ideas. Nor would we expect a media company to disclose news of acquisitions it was privately pursuing or a journalist to tell his competitors about stories on which he is working or sources he is using.

在現在這個社會，大型的投資機會相當的稀少且彌足珍貴，除非法令特別要求，我們不可能向潛在的競爭對手透露我們的動向，就像我們也不可能期待對手告訴我們他的想法，同樣地我們也不期待媒體能夠揭露他們獨家採訪得到的購並消息，就像是一個記者不可能向他的同業透露他正在努力追蹤的獨家新聞。


I find it uncomfortable when friends or acquaintances mention that they are buying X because it has been reported - incorrectly - that Berkshire is a buyer. However, I do not set them straight. If they want to participate in whatever Berkshire actually is buying, they can always purchase Berkshire stock. But perhaps that is too simple. Usually, I suspect, they find it more exciting to buy what is being talked about. Whether that strategy is more profitable is another question.

我特別覺得很不高興，當我的朋友或是舊識告訴我說他們買進X公司的股票，因為報紙錯誤地報導說Berkshire已經買進這家公司的股票，不過後來我發現事情沒有那麼單純，他們會買的原因主要是因為這些股票實在太熱門，至於是否能夠真正獲利則是另外一回事。


Financing

財務方面


Shortly after yearend, Berkshire sold two issues of debentures, totaling $250 million. Both issues mature in 2018 and will be retired at an even pace through sinking fund operations that begin in 1999. Our overall interest cost, after allowing for expenses of issuance, is slightly over 10%. Salomon was our investment banker, and its service was excellent.

在年度結束後不久，Berkshire發行了兩期的債券，總共的金額是2.5億美元，到期日皆為2018年並且會從1999年開始慢慢分期由償債基金贖回，包含發行成本在內，平均的資金成本約在10%上下，負責這次發行債券的投資銀行就是所羅門，他們提供了絕佳的服務。


Despite our pessimistic views about inflation, our taste for debt is quite limited. To be sure, it is likely that Berkshire could improve its return on equity by moving to a much higher, though still conventional, debt-to-business-value ratio. It's even more likely that we could handle such a ratio, without problems, under economic conditions far worse than any that have prevailed since the early 1930s.

儘管我們對於通貨膨脹抱持悲觀的看法，我們對於舉債的興趣還是相當有限，雖然可以肯定的是Berkshire可以靠提高舉債來增加投資報酬，即使這樣做我們的負債比例還是相當的保守，且就算如此我們很有信心應該可以應付比1930經濟大蕭條更壞的經濟環境。


But we do not wish it to be only likely that we can meet our obligations; we wish that to be certain. Thus we adhere to policies - both in regard to debt and all other matters - that will allow us to achieve acceptable long-term results under extraordinarily adverse conditions, rather than optimal results under a normal range of conditions.

但我們還是不願意這種大概沒有問題的做法，我們要的是百分之百的確定，因此我們堅持一項政策，那就是不管是舉債或是其他任何方面，我們希望是能夠在最壞的情況下得到合理的結果，而不是預期在樂觀的情況下，得到很好的利益。


Good business or investment decisions will eventually produce quite satisfactory economic results, with no aid from leverage. Therefore, it seems to us to be both foolish and improper to risk what is important (including, necessarily, the welfare of innocent bystanders such as policyholders and employees) for some extra returns that are relatively unimportant. This view is not the product of either our advancing age or prosperity: Our opinions about debt have remained constant.

只要是好公司或是好的投資決策，不靠投資杠杆，最後還是能夠得到令人滿意的結果，因此我們認為為了一點額外的報酬，將重要的東西(也包含政策制定者與員工福祉)暴露在不必要的風險之下是相當愚蠢且不適當的。


However, we are not phobic about borrowing. (We're far from believing that there is no fate worse than debt.) We are willing to borrow an amount that we believe - on a worst-case basis - will pose no threat to Berkshire's well-being. Analyzing what that amount might be, we can look to some important strengths that would serve us well if major problems should engulf our economy: Berkshire's earnings come from many diverse and well-entrenched businesses; these businesses seldom require much capital investment; what debt we have is structured well; and we maintain major holdings of liquid assets. Clearly, we could be comfortable with a higher debt-to-business-value ratio than we now have.

當然我們不會畏懼借貸(我們還不至於認為借錢是萬惡不赦的)，我們還是願意在估計不會損及Berkshire利益的最壞情況下，進行舉債，至於這個限度在哪里，我們就必須評估自己本身的實力，Berkshire的獲利來自於許多不同且扎實的產業，這些產業通常不需要額外大量的投資，負債的部份也相當健全，同時我們還保有大量的流動資產，很明顯的，我們大可以承擔比現在更高的負債比例。


One further aspect of our debt policy deserves comment: Unlike many in the business world, we prefer to finance in anticipation of need rather than in reaction to it. A business obtains the best financial results possible by managing both sides of its balance sheet well. This means obtaining the highest-possible return on assets and the lowest-possible cost on liabilities. It would be convenient if opportunities for intelligent action on both fronts coincided. However, reason tells us that just the opposite is likely to be the case: Tight money conditions, which translate into high costs for liabilities, will create the best opportunities for acquisitions, and cheap money will cause assets to be bid to the sky. Our conclusion: Action on the liability side should sometimes be taken independent of any action on the asset side.

我們舉債政策還有一向特點值得說明，不像其他公司，我們比較希望能夠預先準備而不是事後補救，一家公司若能夠同時管好資產負債表的兩側，就會有不錯的成績，這代表一方面要能夠將資產的報酬率提高，一方面要能夠將負債的資金成本降低，若是兩邊都能碰巧的兼顧那就太好了，不過事實告訴我們，通常情況正好相反，當資金吃緊時，代表負債的成本上升，這正是對外購並的最好時機，因為便宜的資金有時會將競標的資產飆到天價，我們的結論是，在舉債方面的動作，有時應該要跟購置資產方面的動作分開做。


Alas, what is "tight" and "cheap" money is far from clear at any particular time. We have no ability to forecast interest rates and - maintaining our usual open-minded spirit - believe that no one else can. Therefore, we simply borrow when conditions seem non-oppressive and hope that we will later find intelligent expansion or acquisition opportunities, which - as we have said - are most likely to pop up when conditions in the debt market are clearly oppressive. Our basic principle is that if you want to shoot rare, fast-moving elephants, you should always carry a loaded gun.

當然何謂吃緊﹖何謂便宜的資金﹖很難有一個清楚的分野，我們無法去預測利率的走向，所以我們隨時保持開放的心態，隨機地在市場還沒有那麼悲觀時借錢，期望之後可以找到合適的購並或投資標的，而通常如同我們先前所提到的，大概是會在債市情況悲觀時出現，我們一個基本的原則就是，如果你想要獵捕那種罕見且移動迅速的大象，那麼你的槍枝就要隨時上膛準備。


Our fund-first, buy-or-expand-later policy almost always penalizes near-term earnings. For example, we are now earning about 6 1/2% on the $250 million we recently raised at 10%, a disparity that is currently costing us about $160,000 per week. This negative spread is unimportant to us and will not cause us to stretch for either acquisitions or higher-yielding short-term instruments. If we find the right sort of business elephant within the next five years or so, the wait will have been worthwhile.

我們這種先準備資金，之後再買進擴張的政策，雖然會對我們短期間的盈餘造成影響，例如我們之前取得10%成本的2.5億美元，現在大概只能賺得6.5%的收益，中間的利差損失每個禮拜大概是16萬美元，這對我們來說，只是個小數目，也不會迫使我們去從事一些短期高風險的投資，只要我們能在未來五年內找到理想的目標獵物，這一切等待都是值得的。


Miscellaneous

其他事項


We hope to buy more businesses that are similar to the ones we have, and we can use some help. If you have a business that fits the following criteria, call me or, preferably, write.

我們希望能夠找到更多像我們現在擁有的企業，當然這需要一些幫助，如同你知道有公司符合以下的條件，打電話或者最好是寫信給我。


(1) large purchases (at least $10 million of after-tax earnings),

钜額交易(每年稅後盈餘至少有一千萬美元)




(2) demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections are of little interest to us, nor are "turnaround" situations),

持續穩定獲利(我們對有遠景或具轉機的公司沒興趣)




(3) businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt,

高股東報酬率(並且甚少舉債)




(4) management in place (we can't supply it),

具備管理階層(我們無法提供)




(5) simple businesses (if there's lots of technology, we won't understand it),

簡單的企業(若牽涉到太多高科技，我們弄不懂)




(6) an offering price (we don't want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily, about a transaction when price is unknown).

合理的價格(在價格不確定前，我們不希望浪費自己與對方太多時間)





We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise complete confidentiality and a very fast answer - customarily within five minutes - as to whether we're interested. We prefer to buy for cash, but will consider issuing stock when we receive as much in intrinsic business value as we give. We invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom we have done business in the past. For the right business - and the right people - we can provide a good home. On the other hand, we frequently get approached about acquisitions that don't come close to meeting our tests: new ventures, turnarounds, auction-like sales, and the ever-popular (among brokers) "I'm-sure-something-will-work-out-if-you-people-get-to-know-each-other." None of these attracts us in the least.

我們不會進行敵意的購並，並承諾完全保密並儘快答復是否感興趣(通常不超過五分鐘) ，我們傾向采現金交易，除非我們所換得的內含價值跟我們付出的一樣多，否則不考慮發行股份。我們歡迎可能的賣方與那些過去與我們合作過的物件打聽，對於那些好的公司與好的經營階層，我們可以提供一個好的歸屬。另一方面我們也持續接到一些不符合我們條件的詢問，包括新事業、轉機股、拍賣案以及最常見的仲介案(那些說你們要是能過碰一下面，一定會感興趣之類的) 。在此重申我們對這些一點興趣都沒有。


Besides being interested in the purchases of entire businesses as described above, we are also interested in the negotiated purchase of large, but not controlling, blocks of stock comparable to those we hold in Cap Cities and Salomon. We have a special interest in purchasing convertible preferreds as a long-term investment, as we did at Salomon.

除了以上買下整家公司的購並案外，我們也會考慮買進一大部份不具控制權的股份，就像我們在資本城與所羅門這兩個Case一樣，尤其是我們對於像這次購買所羅門一樣的可轉換特別股當作長期投資特別有興趣。


And now a bit of deja vu. Most of Berkshire's major stockholders received their shares at yearend 1969 in a liquidating distribution from Buffett Partnership, Ltd. Some of these former partners will remember that in 1962 I encountered severe managerial problems at Dempster Mill Manufacturing Co., a pump and farm implement manufacturing company that BPL controlled.

接下來是一點記憶回顧，大部分Berkshire的大股東是在1969年清算巴菲特合夥事業時取得本公司股份的，這些合夥的夥伴可能還記得當初在1962年，我曾經在巴菲特合夥事業所投資控制的Dempster-一家幫浦與農用機具製造公司，面臨經營上重大的難題。


At that time, like now, I went to Charlie with problems that were too tough for me to solve. Charlie suggested the solution might lie in a California friend of his, Harry Bottle, whose special knack was never forgetting the fundamental. I met Harry in Los Angeles on April 17, 1962, and on April 23 he was in Beatrice, Nebraska, running Dempster. Our problems disappeared almost immediately. In my 1962 annual letter to partners, I named Harry "Man of the Year."

在當時我帶著我無法解決的問題去找查理，就像是現在一樣，查理建議我在加州他有一位朋友叫Harry Bottle非常腳踏實地，或許可以幫得上忙，我在當年四月去洛杉磯拜訪他，一個禮拜後，他就被請到內布拉斯加州來管理Dempster，此後問題立刻獲得解決，記得在1962年的年報中，我還特地將Harry封為年度風雲人物。


Fade to 24 years later: The scene is K & W Products, a small Berkshire subsidiary that produces automotive compounds. For years K & W did well, but in 1985-86 it stumbled badly, as it pursued the unattainable to the neglect of the achievable. Charlie, who oversees K & W, knew there was no need to consult me. Instead, he called Harry, now 68 years old, made him CEO, and sat back to await the inevitable. He didn't wait long. In 1987 K & W's profits set a record, up more than 300% from 1986. And, as profits went up, capital employed went down: K & W's investment in accounts receivable and inventories has decreased 20%.

24年後，場景搬到Berkshire 另外一家子公司K & W公司，一家專門生產自動機具的小公司，過去這家公司做得還不錯，不過到了1985-1986年卻突然發生狀況，盲目追求達不到的東西，卻放棄現有可以做的產品，負責管理監督K & W的查理，知道可以不必知會我，直接找到現年68歲的Harry，任命他為CEO，然後就靜待結果出來，事實上他沒有等多久，到了1987年隔年，K & W的獲利就創下新高，比1986年成長三倍，由於獲利提升，該公司所需的資金也就跟著減少，該公司的應收及存貨水準減少了20%。


If we run into another managerial problem ten or twenty years down the road, you know whose phone will ring.

所以要是在往後的十年、二十年，我們的被投資事業又發生問題時，你就知道誰的電話又會響了。


About 97.2% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's 1987 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions made through the program were $4.9 million, and 2,050 charities were recipients.

大約有97.2%的有效股權參與1987年的股東指定捐贈計畫，總計約490萬美元捐出的款項分配給2,050家慈善機構。


A recent survey reported that about 50% of major American companies match charitable contributions made by directors (sometimes by a factor of three to one). In effect, these representatives of the owners direct funds to their favorite charities, and never consult the owners as to their charitable preferences. (I wonder how they would feel if the process were reversed and shareholders could invade the directors' pockets for charities favored by the shareholders.) When A takes money from B to give to C and A is a legislator, the process is called taxation. But when A is an officer or director of a corporation, it is called philanthropy. We continue to believe that contributions, aside from those with quite clear direct benefits to the company, should reflect the charitable preferences of owners rather than those of officers and directors.

最近一項研究顯示約有50%的美國大公司的捐贈計畫是由董事會所決定，這等於是由代表公司所有股東的一小群人來決定公司資金捐給他們所偏愛的慈善機構，卻從來不會去管股東們的意見，(我很懷疑若情況剛好相反，由股東們來決定這些董事口袋裏的錢要捐給誰時，他們會有什麼樣的反應)，當甲從乙的身上拿錢給丙時，若甲是立法者，則這個過程叫做課稅，若甲是企業的主管或是經理人時，這就叫做是慈善，我們仍然堅信除非是捐給那些很明顯對於公司有助益的單位時，應該要先徵詢股東們而非僅僅是經理人或是董事的意見。


We urge new shareholders to read the description of our shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on pages 54 and 55. If you wish to participate in future programs, we strongly urge that you immediately make sure your shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in "street" name or nominee name. Shares not so registered on September 30, l988 will be ineligible for the 1988 program.

我們敦促新加入的股東，仔細閱讀年報上有關股東捐贈計畫的詳細內容，如果在未來年度內，你想要參加這類的計畫，我們強烈建議你將股份登記在自己而不是受託人的名下，必須在1988年9月30日之前完成登記，才有權利參與1988年的計畫。


Last year we again had about 450 shareholders at our annual meeting. The 60 or so questions they asked were, as always, excellent. At many companies, the annual meeting is a waste of time because exhibitionists turn it into a sideshow. Ours, however, is different. It is informative for shareholders and fun for us. (At Berkshire's meetings, the exhibitionists are on the dais.)

去年總共有450位股東參加年度股東會，總計提出了60個左右精彩的問題，在許多公司股東會只是浪費時間，因為大多流於形式，不過我們的股東會卻不一樣，股東們非常具有建設性且帶來了許多歡樂。


This year our meeting will be on May 23, 1988 in Omaha, and we hope that you come. The meeting provides the forum for you to ask any owner-related questions you may have, and we will keep answering until all (except those dealing with portfolio activities or other proprietary information) have been dealt with.

今年的股東會將在1988年5月23日在奧瑪哈舉行，我們希望你們都能來參加，這個會議提供一個場所讓你能夠提出任何與股東有關的問題，我們會一直回答到所有股東都滿意為止(除了那些想要知道投資組合明牌或是內線消息的人)


Last year we rented two buses - for $100 - to take shareholders interested in the trip to the Furniture Mart. Your actions demonstrated your good judgment: You snapped up about $40,000 of bargains. Mrs. B regards this expense/sales ratio as on the high side and attributes it to my chronic inattention to costs and generally sloppy managerial practices. But, gracious as always, she has offered me another chance and we will again have buses available following the meeting. Mrs. B says you must beat last year's sales figures, and I have told her she won't be disappointed.

去年我們花了100元租兩台巴士載著有興趣的股東到傢俱廣場，大家的行動展現了明智的抉擇，總共買下了約4萬美元的東西，B太太認為這樣的營業費用比例太高，認為這都是我個人長久以來對於成本沒有概念、管理鬆散的緣故，不過還是一樣大方，今年她再次給我機會，在會後還是會有巴士等著各位，B太太希望我一定要打破去年的記錄，而我也已經答應她不會讓她失望。


Warren E. Buffett Chairman of the Board
February 29, 1988

華倫．巴菲特 董事會主席
1988年2月29日